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The thesis focuses on Germany's Mexican policies from
1911 to 1917, with particular attention given to the con-

nection of these policies to political relations between
the United States and Germany and between the United States
and Mexico.

The paper also attempts to place German activ-

ities in Mexico within the context of Germany's desire to
promote its political and economic interests on a worldwide scale.

Although some unpublished sources were con-

sulted, the account relies mostly on published documents,
memoirs, and secondary sources for its factual basis.
After a brief discussion of trends in German-Amer-
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can relations during the years leading up to the First
World War, and a summary of German economic interests in
Mexico, the thesis examines a number of means employed by
Germany to exploit the value of Mexico's proximity to the
United States.

German policy with regard to Mexico was

largely calculated to protect and promote Germany's longterm strategic interests in Latin America and throughout
the world.

Germany maintained a low profile in Mexico

during most of this period, but contemplated various
strategies involving Mexico to stir up trouble between
the United States and other countries, most particularly
Japan.
The advent of the First World War, however, brought
about an intensification of Germany's activities in Mexico.

Hoping that the United States could be diverted or

tied down by significant difficulties in Mexico, which
was at that time torn between revolutionary factions, Germany employed various means to create and intensify
tensions between the United States and Mexico.

The

thesis examines some of these attempts, and concludes that
Germany's activity in Mexico was an indirect but important
factor behind President Woodrow Wilson's decision to declare war on Germany in 1917.
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INTRODUCTION
In September 1910, Mexico City was the setting for
one of those strikingly ironic scenes that history throws
in the

~aces

times.

of those who believe they understand their

The occasion was a showcase festival, a month-

long national holiday commemorating the centennial of Mexican independence but in reality an ostentatious and smug
celebration of the longevity, wisdom, and power of Porfirio Dla.z, the aging dictator who had ruled Mexico for
almost thirty-five years and who had become for many the
living symbol of a new, "progressive" Mexico of political
stability and economic growth.

Speeches, banquets, and

parties were plentiful that September.

Giant pageants

were held for as many as a half-million spectators; buildings, monuments, and statues were erected and dedicated.
The city was alive with parades and fireworks.
The lavish birthday party for Diaz and his country
was also intended to signal to the world that Mexico had
come of age and entered the select community of civilized
nations.

Towards this end the Dlaz government had

ed the expenses for delegations from all over the world to
witness the spectacle and pay their respects to the man
who made it all possible.

The foreigners came, and they

were impressed by the beautiful French architecture along
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the Paseo de la Reforma; by the spectacular Italianate opera house; and also, perhaps, by their imported
waiters.
European.

Europe~n

Mexico was becoming civilized, it was becoming
The delegates were impressed, too, by the sump-

tuous banquet held for them in the National Palace on
September 15, Diaz's eightieth birthday and the eve of Mexican Independence Day.

In appreciation of Don Porfirio's

sparkling hospitality and Mexico's new civilized spirit,
the 2,000 delegates present that night consumed ten box-car
loads of imported French champagne.
All this was characteristic of some of the most dis~

agreeable aspects of the Diaz regime: its perpetuation of
appalling economic inequalities, its cultural alienation
from the Mexican masses, its overweening solicitation of
foreign interests.

The foreign delegates probably did not

realize that Diaz had spent more on that single month of
celebrations than he had budgeted for Mexican education
for the entire fiscal year.

Less than nine months later,

however, Diaz was forced into permanent exile.

As the ex-

dictator sailed away from Mexico on the German steamer
Ypiranga, perhaps he remembered that his first official
act of that glorious September had been to dedicate a
lunatic asylum.
The insensitive ''scientific'' domestic policies of the
Porfiriato created enormous political and social pressures
that for years had been successfully stifled through a ju-

J
dicious combination of generosity and brutal repression;
Diaz's motto was pan .Q. palo, .. bread or the stick."

But by

late 1910, even as o(az was basking in self-sponsored adulation, several factors had combined to undermine the
regime's foundations.

In early 1911 Francisco I. Madero's

"unarmed and motley revel t•• (as the American Ambassador
described it) provided a push, and the carefully constructed Porfirian edifice began its progressive collapse, unleashing pent-up social and political conflicts that ultimately could be resolved only by force of arms.
For almost a decade Mexico was convulsed by a vicious
civil war between uncompromising factions that left hundreds
of thousands of people dead and huge amounts of property
damaged or destroyed.

The bitter domestic struggles did

not take place in a vacuum; Diaz's policies had made some
level of foreign involvement in the revolution almost inevitable.

The fighting and increasingly nationalistic orien-

tation of the revolution were continual sources of irritation and even alarm for the United States, Great Britain,
and other countries that together had invested billions of
dollars in Mexico during Diaz's accommodating administration.
As those powers drifted into war amongst themselves, Mexico's strategic location and valuable resources ensured that
the revolutionaries would not be left to settle their differences without foreign interference.

For one embattled

nation in particular, the German Empire, the Mexican revo-

4
lution seemed to offer excellent opportunities to further
its national interests and ambitions.
This essay explores the nature and extent of German
interests and activities in Mexico from 1911 to 1917.

It

is impossible to examine this subject in isolation, however, because most of the German efforts in Mexico during
this period were contemplated or undertaken as adjuncts to
a consideration of far greater importance to Germany--its
relations with Mexico's northern neighbor, the United
States.

Germany's policy toward the United States, in

turn, was formulated to promote what German leaders believed to be the Empire's most pressing interests: the
attainment of world power status, and the protection and
strengthening of Germany's position in Europe.

Ultimately,

Germany's policies concerning the United States and Mexico
were determined by the overriding need to win its fight
for survival during the First World War.
Britain's successful blockade of Germany gave the
Allies a crucial advantage in the stalemated trench war
in Europe, but a most important element of this advantage
was the surprisingly productive capability of the economy
of the United States, which was providing Germany's enemies
with a tremendous flow of food, supplies, and munitions
unavailable elsewhere.

To stem or divert this trade, which

was so damaging to the success of their entire war effort,
the Germans resorted to various expedients, both legitimate
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and covert, including diplomatic exchanges, propaganda campaigns, the establishment of phony import-export companies,
sabotage, U-boat warfare, and repeated attempts to draw the
United States into a war with Mexico.
Germany's intrigues in Mexico have gone relatively
unnoticed by historians until recently.

Even the most no-

torious of the attempts, the "Zimmermann telegram" affair,
has often been dismissed as insignificant or even ludicrous
aside from its undeniable impact on American public opinion.
This is understandable to some extent, given the more dramatic events taking place at the time in Europe and the
United States, the generally covert nature of the German
activities themselves, and the relatively minor attention
given to U.S.-Mexican diplomatic history on the whole.
The German activities in Mexico nevertheless played an important role in the events surrounding the entry of the
United States into the First World War, not least because
they helped to convince American leaders of a real danger
that Germany posed to the interests of the United States.
They undoubtedly had a lasting impact on U.S.-Mexican
relations and on the Mexican revolution itself.

It is not

necessary, then, to overemphasize the significance of Germany's Mexican activities to say that they deserve our attention.
Germany's wartime policy was far more vigorous and
determined than it had been in earlier years, and covered
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a wide range of activities with varying levels of success.
Throughout this period Mexico was an important base for
German espionage, sabotage, and propaganda activities.
In addition, revolutionary factions were approached or
utilized in attempts to provoke a war with the United
States.

These efforts failed, but if German activities

were sometimes fruitless and even counterproductive, it
should not be concluded that they were uniformly absurd
or without a reasonable chance of success; and a major
success, if indeed one had occurred, could have repaid
Germany's relatively small investment in such activities
many times over and perhaps even changed the course of
the war.
A few historians have examined various aspects of
this subject over the years.

Friedrich Katz, in parti-

cular, has conducted extensive archival research and unearthed a wealth of material concerning German activities
in Mexico.

While I am especially indebted to Katz for his

work in the German archives, this essay is more concerned
with the impact Germany's Mexican activities had on the
formulation of American foreign policy, a topic which
Katz does not deal with in depth.

Germany's activities

in Mexico, especially during the First World War, were in
a sense merely an extension of similar covert operations
conducted in the United States; in fact, they were often
planned and carried out by the same German personnel.

Amer-
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ican officials were aware of the connection, and this
realization not only heavily influenced American policy
towards Mexico but also contributed to President Wilson's
decision to declare war on Germany in 1917.
Moreover, I have tried to demonstrate that these covert activities were not simply part of a "new strategy
of exploiting social conflicts and anticolonial struggles,"
as Katz writes, but were instead manifestations of a longstanding and elemental contradiction in German foreign
policy, a contradiction which was intensified by the pressures of the world war.

The roots of Germany's Mexican

policies can be directly traced to Germany's decision to
pursue world power status, and its inability to promote
its more ambitious goals in Latin America in a straightforward manner.

CHAPTER I
LATIN AMERICA AND TRENDS IN
GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS,
1898-1914
The retirement of Otto von Bismarck in 1890 brought
to an end the Iron Chancellor's forceful but relatively
cautious handling of Germany's foreign affairs and marked
the beginning of the Empire's self-consciously aggressive
quest to become a world power.

As a united Germany quickly

became an industrial heavyweight during the 1890's, a wide
spectrum of domestic opinion came to believe that the
''struggle for economic existence" now facing Germany demanded concomitant overseas expansion to feed the growing
industrial complex. 1

This conviction was not peculiar to

Germany; in America, too, and in other countries, it was
"widely accepted around the turn of the century that industrialized nations either secured outlets overseas for
their surplus goods or succumbed to stagnation and revolu2
tion at home and defeat and humiliation abroad."
For many Germans, overseas expansion also seemed a
logical consequence of national unification.

Max Weber

argued that the unification of Germany "would better have
been left undone if it was meant to be the end and not the
beginning of a German policy of world power.")

The drives
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for political and economic expansion were soon combined in
the German mind into a single concept, Weltpolitik (world

policy),

To the hietorian Karl Lamprecht, Weltpolitik waa

the product of an irresistible historical process:4
The hallmark of the age ... is expansion, expansion of an economic nature and then, to support
and extend it, political expansion. The~economic]
instinct for power and the movement for national
unity were succeeded by the age for worl policy.
Official and popular enthusiasm in Germany for Weltpolitik

took a big step forward in April 1898 with the

passage of the first Naval Law, which authorized the construction of nineteen battleships, eight armored cruisers,
and twelve large and thirty light cruisers by 1904.

It was

a signal that Germany would now compete in earnest with the
largest naval powers;
world power.

Germany was on the high road to

Secretary of State Bernard von Bulow declared

to the Reichstag in 1899 that "The times of powerlessness
and submissiveness are gone and shall never return .... in
the coming century the German people will become either the
hammer or the anvil."5
By the turn of the century, Germany's expansionist
spirit, and especially its scarcely concealed ambitions
in East Asia and Latin America, had produced severe tensions with the United States.

America, under the influence

of Captain Mahan and other "big navy" proponents, was also
engaged in a program of naval building and perceived its
growing economic and strategic interests in these areas
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threatened by Germany's increasing boldness.

6

The Samoan

crisis of 1899 had created animosities and provided an
early example of the dangers involved in German-American
competition over strategic territories, but if anything
the competition between the two powers became more intense
as the 19th century drew to a close.
An obviously attractive target for German industrialists and naval planners was Latin America, with its relatively untapped market, valuable natural resources, and
excellent, strategically placed harbors.

German naval men

had toyed with the idea of establishing naval bases in the
Caribbean as early as 1870,but Bismarck had not been "positively interested in any such project."?

His minister in

Washington stated in 1874 that "our aversion against the
outdated colonial policy and other reasons would always
8
keep us from aspiring to overseas possessions."
By the late 1890's, however, this attitude had
changed.

Hundreds of thousands of German immigrants had

already penetrated Latin America and were well-established
within the merchant community in several countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico.

As a result,

nationalistic Pan-German societies began to clamor for
political expansion in Latin America, and German naval
planners increasingly appreciated the value of aquiring
strategically placed harbors in the western hemisphere.9
Germany saw the United States as an economic threat

11
to its plans for trade expansion in Latin America.

In 1896

Kaiser Wilhelm II attempted to form an anti-American combination among the European powers to ··rend off the common
danger," as the German secretary of state expressed it to a
Russian envoy.

This effort was partly in response to Presi-

dent McKinley's attempts to conclude reciprocity agreements
with various Latin American countries.

The Kaiser believed

that if McKinley were entirely successful, the Americans
could eliminate their European competition in the area.
Already Chile and Uruguay had cancelled trade agreements
with Europe; and these cancellations, the Kaiser irritably
declared, would be the "beginning of a war to the death''
between Germany and the United States if only he had his
fleet already built. 10
Germany's economic progress in Latin America had in
turn aroused the suspicions and jealousy of its North American competitors.

Americans were also disturbed by the

Germans' disregard for the Monroe Doctrine: the retired
Bismarck, for example, characterized the Doctrine in 1897
as an ''extraordinary piece of insolence . .,ll

Theodore Roose-

velt was more understanding of the German position than were
many of his countrymen when he wrote in 1897: 12
I am by no means sure that I heartily respect the
little Kaiser but in his colonial plans I think he
is entirely right from the standpoint of the German
race ••. If I were a German I should want the German
race to expand. I should be glad to see it expand
in the only two places left for the ethnic, as distinguished from the political expansion of the
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European peoples; that is, in South Africa and temperate South America. Therefore, as a German I
should be delighted to upset the English in South
Africa, and to defy the Americans and their Monroe
Doctrine in South America .• ,,
The Spanish-American War, and especially Admiral
Dewey's dramatic confrontation with the German Admiral
Diederichs at Manila Bay, brought the rivalry to a head
and fired contempt and hatred on both sides.

During the

height of the Manila crisis Dewey expressed his eagerness
to tangle with the Germans:
anyhow,"

he said.

"It is indecent to fight Spain

"Now, if France could come in too, we

could save our faces, but best of all if Germany would come
in. If only Germany could be persuaded to come in." 1 3
There was, as William Langer described it, "an almost pathological suspicion of Germany ... prevalent in American political and diplomatic circles. 1114

John Hay, then ambassador
to Britain, wrote Henry Cabot Lodge that 1 5
The jealousy and animosity felt toward us in Germany ... can scarcely be exaggerated ••. the Vaterland
is all on fire with greed, and terror of us. They
want the Philippines, the Carolines, and Samoas-they want to get in our market and keep us out of
theirs ••. there is to the German mind, something
monstrous in the thought that a war should take
place and they not profit by it.
This distrust of Germany reached from coast to coast.

The Washington Post

wrote that "we know ••. that in the Ger-

man government the United States has a sleepless and insatiable enemy,"

while the Morning Oregonian called Germany our ''bitter, relentless, uncompromising enemy • .,l 6

~

lJ
Faced with reactions of this nature, Theodor von Holleben,
the German ambassador in Washington, wrote home in 1893
that the Americans were completely hostile to Germany, ''the
most hated land."

"They believe us capable of anything,"
he wrote, "especially the worst." 1 7
On the other side of the Atlantic, Wilhelm II pri-

vately railed against what he called the "Anglo-American
Limited Company for International Theft and World Incitement," and wanted to call on other European powers to rally
against the rough treatment Spain was suffering at the hands
of the United States, this "Yankee audicity supported by
John Bull." 18 As was often the case in such situations,
Bulow was able to restrain the impetuous Kaiser from action.
Later, when a Prussian envoy wrote Wilhelm that the American
victory over Spain constituted interference in European affairs, the Kaiser responded with his peculiar elan, "Right!
Therefore quickly a strong fleet.

Then the rest will fall

into place.·~9 And Bismarck's testy remarks in an 1898 interview no doubt reinforced some American judgements concerning
German intentions in Latin America.
20
Doctrine, he snorted:

Asked about the Monroe

That is a species of arrogance peculiarly American
and inexcusable •.. And how will you enforce it? And
against whom? The Powers most interested, now that
Spain is out of the way, are England and France,the
two leading naval powers. Will you drive them off
American waters with your pigmy navy? The Monroe
Doctrine is a spectre that would vanish in plain
daylight.

14
Comments like this, however, only served to convince
Americans that it was Germany that was "most interested" in
defying the Monroe Doctrine.

The "arrogance," fears, and

hopes of both Germans and Americans combined to create a
volatile atmosphere in the relations between the two
nations over the next few years, forming a latent animosity
that resulted in an overabundance of accusations and unofficial wild talk on both sides.

In a speech before the

Grant Memorial Association in New York on April 27, 1900,
for example, Elihu Root gave voice to what was becoming a
popular feeling.

"No man who carefully watches the signs

of the times," he declared, "can fail to see that the American people will within a few years have to either abandon
the Monroe Doctrine or fight for it, and we are not going
to abandon it." His audience responded with cries of "Hear!
Hear!'' 21

These sentiments were echoed and encouraged by

certain elements in Britain, where anti-German feelings were
also running high.
Spectator

Commenting on Root's speech, the London
asserted: 22

No American ... can fail to see that the [Monroe] doctrine cannot be supported by tall talk ••. Germany
would simply consider whether America had physical
power to maintain it. It she hadn't, America's
historical claims wouldn't be worth a straw .•. If
America should wish to enforce the Monroe Doctrine
she must be able to destroy the German fleet.
Among the military establishments especially, and in
certain civilian circles on both sides of the Atlantic, the
prospect of a German-American war began to gain a level of
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acceptance and even a rather absurd aura of respectability.
In America, Henry Cabot Lodge worried about an attack on
Boston (''The German emperor has moments when he is wild
enough to do anything·• 2 3), while Theodore Roosevelt wrote
to an English friend that he wouldn't be "sorry to see a
bit of a spar with Germany ... The burning of New York and a
few other sea coast cities would be a good object lesson in
the need of an adequate system of coast defenses ..... 24
A conversation between an American naval officer and
a German counterpart, reported in 1903 to Captain Sigsbee,
the chief of U.S. Naval Intelligence, illustrates the feud
and its growing danger for both countries.

The German

officer had predicted a war for commercial supremacy in
Latin America between the United States and Germany.

The

Empire's ''teeming and rapidly increasing population" had to
have ''outlets," the German officer contended, adding that
"South America offers a most favorable field."

Moreover,

he said, ''The official class of Germany has no regard for
the Monroe Doctrine," and he believed Germany "would easily
be victorious at war with the United States."

Sigsbee sent

the report to the Secretary of the· Navy with his full endorsement, saying that his own estimate of the situation
was ''precisely as it is stated in this paper." 25
At this time Gennan war contingency plans did in fact
single out the United States as Germany's most likely adversary in a next war.

In March 1903 Vice Admiral Buchsel,
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chief of the Admiralty Staff, reported to the Kaiser that 26
There can be only~ objective for Germany's war
strategy: direct pressure on the American east

coast and its most populous areas, especially New
York; that is, a merciless offensive designed to
confront the American people with an unbearable
situation through the dissemination of terror and
through damaging enemy trade and property.
Since Germany could not hope to win a war of attrition
with the United States, it was hoped that a radical offensive, including an early decisive naval victory, would
force the Americans to sue for peace.

But, the Kaiser was

told, the "necessary prerequisite" for a war with the United
States would be a favorable "political constellation" in
Europe.

"Any uncertainty in Europe would preclude a suc-

cessful war against the United States.
a war, but it can be forced on us." 2 7

Thus we do not seek

American naval planners, on their part, believed that
the United States had to be on constant guard against a war
with Germany, the country many officers believed was the
United States' only possible opponent.

Their biggest fear

was that Germany would acquire a base in the Caribbean,
since this was thought to be a prerequisite to a successful
war against the United States, and would represent a threat
to the future isthmian cana1. 28
It is certainly true that Tirpitz and other naval officers appreciated the value of a Caribbean naval base or
coaling station, and they were willing to risk antagonizing
the United States, within certain limits, to obtain one.
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To some extent these officers had the support of the Kaiser,
who believed that such an acquisition would be entirely
within Germany's rights.

For example, when Holleben wrote

Wilhelm in February 1900 to caution him concerning American
sensitivity to foreign presences in the western hemisphere,
the Kaiser scribbled on the dispatch "That is irrelevant!
South America is no concern of the Yankees!"

In May, under

a similar dispatch, he noted "Once we have a decent fleet
this, to a certain degree, becomes immaterial.

South Amer-

ica simply is of no concern to the Yankees."

And on yet
another cautionary dispatch: "Fleet, fleet, fleet." 29
But Bulow, who became Chancellor in 1900, consistently
and successfully blocked attempts by the Admiralty to obtain
the Kaiser's permission for the acquisition of a naval base.
Bulow and the Foreign Office, although in sympathy with Germany's expansionist aims, wished to avoid any serious friction with the United States, at least until a favorable
"political constellation" appeared in Europe.

Nevertheless,

Germany's obvious ambition to acquire such a base, combined
with the Navy's attempts to scout out a likely site in case
of a favorable decision by the Kaiser, led to much of the
bad blood between the United States and Germany during this
period.
The Germans were rumored to have designs all over
Latin America:

Colombia, Brazil, the Danish West Indies,

the Galapagos, Mexico, Margarita Island, and the Dominican
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Republic were just a few of the places believed to be
threatened.

A fear that Germany might be tempted to ac-

quire part of Cuba had inspired Elihu Root to insert into
the Platt Amendment the second article, which forbade
Cuba to transfer, sell, or lease any part of its national
territory to a foreign power.

"You cannot understand the

Platt Amendment, " Root said years later, 'unless you know
something about the character of Kaiser Wilhelm the
Sec and." JO
Yet because of Germany's increasingly difficult position in Europe, the real threat of German political expansion in South America and the Caribbean (whether in the form
of bases or actual colonization) was "more imagined than
real,'' as Melvin Small, Dexter Perkins, and others have convincingly demonstrated.Ji

The formulation of German policy

with respect to two rumored sites, the Danish West Indies
and Margarita Island (off the coast of Colombia) will serve
to illustrate how German naval ambitions could be thwarted
by the Foreign Office yet also fuel the suspicions of wary
Americans.
In the winter of 1898 Tirpitz believed the time was
ripe for the acquisition of a naval base in the Caribbean,
either at St. Thomas or Curacao.

The Kaiser, seeing the ad-

vantages of the proposal, submitted the idea to both the
Foreign Office and the Marine for "inclusive study. ,,3 2 It
so happened that at this same time, a former Danish naval
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officer, a Captain Holmfeld
mas'')

(also known as ''Captain Christ-

organized a company to acquire another island, St.

John, which, like St. Thomas, belonged to the Danish West
Indies.

Holmfeld hoped to engineer an "eventual transfer•of

the islands to Germany and realize a good profit from the
transaction.

Tirpitz supported the Captain's plan but, as

Dexter Perkins puts it, the Forei-gn Office had a much
"clearer sense of realities" and argued against the project.
Bulow wrote to Tirpitz that in such an acquisition "the Imperial Government would assume a responsibility which would
be justified ... only in the event of compelling reasons."
Due to the ''present political situation," he continued, the
project was "not advisable" and should be promoted only if
the need was "urgent."

When Tirpitz persisted in his ef-

forts to promote the plan and even published an article arguing for the acquisition of Caribbean naval bases, Bulow,
on the orders of the Kaiser, formally rebuked the admiral,
saying that such agitation was "in9pportune."

German sup-

port for Christmas' plan faded away.33
But the next year, when Christmas went to the United
States to peddle his project, he spiced up his sales pitch
with tales of German ambitions for the islands, and touched
off a furor.

"So they are trying to sneak into the West In-

dies, are they?" John Hay snapped when told of the Germans'
"plans.''

Christmas' "facts" concerning German designs in

the Caribbean inspired a good deal of anti-German sentiment
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in the United States, including Root's speech of having to
"abandon the Monroe Doctrine, or fight for it."

The New

York Times editorialized that the sale of the islands "is
a transaction in which the American people take great interest: "34
... if that settlement involved the sale and attempted transfer of the St. Thomas group .•• to one
of the great powers of Europe a feeling would be
aroused in this country that would dwarf all other
public concerns and might endanger the peace of
nations.
It had been the expectation of just such an uproar that had
convinced Bulow to oppose the project; and even though the
German government had dropped the idea more than a year before, in America it was believed that Germany still maintained devious designs on the islands.
In the 1901 case of Margarita Island, the rumors seem
to have had even less foundation.

A commander of an Ameri-

can warship observed a German ship taking soundings in the
waters surrounding the island, and reported his suspicions.
He noted that "the Germans are not much given to unselfish
work for the benefit of mariners," and that they had performed similar acts before taking Kiau-chou in 1898.

After

the U.S. Navy had ''worked itself into a considerable frenzy" over the matter~5 Secretary of State Hay asked that the
American charge in Berlin make "discreet inquiries.''

The

German government not only denied that any acquisitions
were contemplated around Margarita, but also issued a gen-
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eral and inclusive denial of any plans whatsoever to acquire territory of any kind in the western hemisphere, a
denial which Dexter Perkins, after much research, has determined should "distinctly be taken at face value ... 3 6

The

Foreign Office was far too concerned with maintaining stable
relations with the United States to allow the Navy's objectives to threaten the peace.
Events surrounding the Venezuelan blockade of 19021903 intensified American suspicions concerning Germany's
designs in the western hemisphere.

Although Germany and

Great Britain were conducting joint operations in a debt
collecting expedition to which the United States had given
its approva137 many Americans were convinced that the Monroe Doctrine was being challenged in Venezuela, and Germany was singled out as the foremost malefactor.

Anti-

German feeling ran high in the United States at this time,
particularly after it was learned that the German gunboat
Panther had shelled a Venezuelan town.

The New York Times

complained that "Worse international manners than Germany
has exhibited from the beginning of this wretched Venezuela
business have rarely come under the observation of civilized
man."

JS

The tide of American indignation was felt in

Europe, and the way in which this debt collecting expedition got out of hand helped to convince Theodore Roosevelt
that the United States would have to police the Caribbean
region to prevent similar incidents from occurring in the
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future.
There is some reason to believe that Gennany would
eventually have made a real effort to challenge the Monroe
Doctrine if the Gennans had actually succeeded in obtaining
a decisive naval superiority over the United States.

Tir-

pitz was thinking along these lines when he observed that
German diplomats would have to "dance on eggs" until the
fleet was completed.39

But aggressive Gennan behavior in

Venezuela, Wilhelm's thoughtless indiscretions, numerous
rumors of German designs in the Caribbean, and Gennany's
refusal at this time to give even lip service to the Monroe Doctrine were exploited and perhaps purposely exaggerated by naval advocates in the United States to give the
U.S. a naval buildup of its own. 40 Moreover, the Germans
had to take into account their position in Europe; and the
very shipbuilding program which Wilhelm and Tirpitz relied
upon for a free hand in the new world was increasingly
causing them troubles in the old.
Just at the time when relations between the United
States and Gennany were becoming difficult, relations
between the United States and Britain were gr-owing noticeably warmer.

Britain's public support of the United States

during the Spanish-American War had been instrumental in
easing tensions; and as early as September 1899 there had
been so much talk Of a secret British-American alliance
that Secretary of State Hay felt compelled to publicly deny
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the rumors.

There was, yes, a "friendly understanding," he

said, "but an alliance must remain, in the present state of
things, an impossible dream." 41
Britain's willingness to accept United States supremacy in the Caribbean helped to cement the relationship.
Partly because of the increasingly threatening naval competition in Europe, and partly because the United States itself was slowly becoming a

respec~able

naval power, the

British had reevaluated their position in the western hemisphere and concluded that it would be wise to avoid dangerous frictions with the United States in the Caribbean.

In

1901, Britain conceded to the United States the right to
build, control, and fortify an isthmian canal; and, in contrast to what Americans perceived as German aggressiveness
in the Caribbean, Britain began to dramatically reduce
the number of its troops and ships stationed there, essentially conceding American hegemony in the Caribbean. 42
Just as German-American tensions were mounting, then, British-American relations were becoming much more cordial.
Britain's conciliatory policy toward the United States
was only one aspect of the worldwide readjustments in bigpower relationships that took place during the first decade
of the twentieth century.

As Germany upset the balance of

power in Europe and the world, new alignments began to take
shape.

German leaders had anticipated this, and had hoped

that Germany's new naval power would make it an attractive
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ally; in this way, Germany had hoped to strengthen its position in Europe even as it extended its power throughout
the world.

43 These hopes had been realized to some extent.

Britain approached Germany on several occassions between
1898 and 1901, but nothing came of the British advances,
largely because Germany insisted on several concessions
which the British were unwilling or unable to give.

Later,

in 1905, the Kaiser negotiated an agreement with Czar Nicholas, but this too proved abortive. 44
As new alignments among other powers took shape, Germany found itself increasingly isolated.

Britain, unable

to reach a satisfactory agreement with Germany, concluded
an alliance with Japan in 1902 and then, in 1904, formed
the Entente Cordial with France.

When in 1905 the Russo-

German Bjorko Agreement was cancelled, and Russia began
flirting with the Entente, it was evident that Weltpolitik
had not achieved the expected results.

Germany's new

might had failed to transform it into an attractive ally;
on the contrary, it was now surrounded by suspicious and
even hostile neighbors.

Rather than finding a "place in

the sun," Germany was now shadowed by anxiety and the fear
of ''encirclement."

Theodore Roosevelt aptly described the

situation in a letter to Hay in April 1905: 4 5
The Kaiser sincerely believes that the English are
planning to attack him and smash his fleet, and
perhaps join France in a war to the death against
him. As a matter of fact the English harbor no
such intentions, but are themselves in a condition
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of panic lest the Kaiser seeretly intend to form an
alliance against them with France or Russia, or
both, to destroy their fleet and blot out the British Empire from the map! It is as funny a case as
I have ever seen of mutual distrust and fear bringing two peoples to the verge of war.
The Kaiser's fear was not as irrational as it may seem.
In 1904 Sir John Fisher, Britain's First Sea Lord, suggested to King Edward VII that the British wipe out the German
fleet with a preemptive attack. The King was aghast: "My
God, Fisher, you must be mad! 1146 But in February 1905
Arthur Lee, the Civil Lord of the Royal Admiralty, publicly stated that "the Royal Navy would get its blow in first
before the other side had time even to read in the newspapers that war had been declared." 4 7 Incidents like this
not only fueled Germany's determination to maintain its
naval program, but also focused Germany's attention on
European affairs.

As a result, the German leadership trod

much more cautiously where the United States was concerned.
After 1905, German diplomats tacitly accepted the Monroe
Doctrine, and real German-American tensions subsided, although rumors of suspicious German activity continued to
appear occasionally.

German merchants continued to be ag-

gressive competitors in the Latin American marketplace
against their British and American rivals in the area, but
their progress was gradual where before it had been rapid.
(See table on next page.)

Any German ambitions to shore up

their economic successes in Latin America with territorial

26
acquisitions were postponed indefinitely as a consequence
of Germany's increasingly vulnerable position in Europe.

TABLE I
PERCENTAGE SHARE OF THE MARKET IN SELECTED LATIN
AMERICAN COUNTRIES FOR BRITAIN~ 9 GERMANY,
AND THE UNITED STATES
Latin
American
Country
Argentina
Brazil
Colombia
Haiti
Mexico
Paraguay
Peru
Venezuela

120) or 1204 Figyres

1211 or 1212 Figyres

Britain Germany U.S.

Britain Germany U.S.

34
28
32
10
13
32
37

25

13
13
18
'2
12
15
16
25

12
11
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73
55
4
18
29

31

25
20
8
13
28
32
21

17
17
14

5

13
28
18
16

15
15
27
74
49
6
23
33

This new spirit was appreciated and reciprocated by
by at least some of America's leaders.

While in 1901

Theodore Roosevelt had been impressed by reports that the
Germans intended to "take a fall out of us," in 1907 he personally reassured the Kaiser that such considerations no
longer bothered him:

"No distrust will be sown between Ger-

many and America by any gossip," he wrote. "I sincerely believe that the growth of good feeling .•. is steady and permanent."

And on another occassion he wrote the Kaiser not

to worry about silly rumors: "I am always being told of Japanese or German or English spies in the most unlikely places
---the Moro castle in Havana, for instance, or some equally
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antiquated fort."50

In 1909 President Taft called a letter

describing German intrigues in South America "absurd, .. and
went on to say that "all the Germans he had met in different
parts of the world preferred to do business out of their
own colonies rather than in them, as they could make more
money.ff5l
In fact, the Germans had ruled out the acquisition of
territory in Latin America, at least for the time being.
But the fears created around the turn of the century by the
German-American naval competition and the Germans' studied
contempt for the Monroe Doctrine lingered in many minds in
the form of suspicion and distrust.

Huntington Wilson, an

undersecretary of state in Taft's administration, wrote
years later that "~erman] plans for crippling the United
States centered around the Isthmus and the Caribbean.
Their dreams of vast empire envisaged the southernmost republics of South America.

We had reason to be wary.'' 52

It is true that Americans had "reason to be wary."
Geopolitical circumstances had dictated that German policymakers shelve their hopes for political expansion into the
western hemisphere, but these circumstances could change
again; and Wilhelm's erratic unpredictability did not inspire confidence in German policy.

Theodore Roosevelt, for

example, wrote to Senator Lodge that53
.... nothing would persuade me to follow the lead or
enter into a close alliance with a man who is so
jumpy, so little capable of continuity of action,
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and therefore, so little capable of being loyal to
his friends or steadfastly hostile to his enemies.
In 1913 and 1914Colonel Edward House, Woodrow Wilson's close advisor, attempted to play on Germany's wellknown ambitions in South America to defuse the tensions
created by worldwide big-power competition.

House envi-

sioned cooperation between Germany, Britain, the United
States, and Japan to develop, pacify, and exploit the
"waste places" of the world (such as China and Latin America).

As House explained his plan, which was "enthusias-

tically'' supported by President Wilson:54
... it would be my endeavor to bring about a better
understanding between England and Germany; that if
England were less intolerant of Germany's expansion, good feeling could be brought between them.
I thought we could encourage Germany to exploit
South America in a legitimate way; that is, by
development of its resources and by sending her
surplus population there; that such a move would
have a beneficial result generally.
He hoped big-power cooperation would "ensure peace and
proper development of the waste places, besides maintaining an open door and equal opportunity to every one everywhere. "55
House's idea was tentatively approved by the German
and British governments, but before substantive negotiations could get underway the European powers drifted into
war over the Serbian crisis.5 6

Nevertheless, House's plan

indicates a broad willingness to accommodate Germany's
hopes for economic expansion in Latin America; German
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energy would be channeled into pursuits that would not
threaten to upset the peace of the world.

It should be

emphasized, however, that House and Wilson envisioned
"legitimate" German expansion in Latin America.

It is un-

likely that the United States would have looked kindly upon
political annexations by Germany in the area.
Germany's position in Europe had made it impossible
for Germany to tackle the United States alone.

Although

many rumors of German designs in Latin America continued to
circulate, and while Germany did in fact attempt to extend
its influence surreptitiously (see next chapter for examples in Mexico), many of these rumors were groundless or
based on flimsy evidence.
It is necessary to be aware of these trends in GerrnanAmerican relations to understand German policy and activities in Mexico, not only because they provide the backdrop
for events, but also because they help to explain the perceptions and expectations of policymakers and their publics.
It will be noted that Germany's Latin American policy at
this time contained certain schizophrenic aspects.

While

nationalistic pan-German societies agitated for actual colonization in Latin America, while naval officers urged the
acquisition of bases, and while Wilhelm stubbornly insisted
that "South America simply is of no concern to the Yankees,"
there was also a pressing need to restrain these ambitious
convictions in the interest of national survival.

There
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was in German foreign policy, then, a constant tension
created by the interplay of incompatible interests which
could not be satisfactorily resolved.

German policy in

Mexico, too, suffered from Germany's inability to resolve
this basic inconsistency, its continual necessity to choose
between promising opportunities and dangerous risks.
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CHAPTER II
CAUTIOUS DEVELOPMENT OF INTERESTS: GERMANY,
MEXICO, AND THE UNITED STATES,
1900-1911
Mexico's proximity to the United States and the predominant American economic presence there helped to make
Mexico somewhat of a special case in the minds of German
policymakers.

German leaders and diplomats appreciated the

value of Mexico's strategic location and contemplated various ways to exploit it in Germany's interests; but since
Germany's relations with Mexico were formulated, as elsewhere, with its world policy objectives in mind, the notorious sensitivity of the United States to Mexican questions
was a constant factor to be considered.

In any case, Ger-

man economic involvement in Mexico never achieved the dimensions it assumed in Brazil, Argentina or Chile during
the same period, and its influence on Mexican leaders was
limited.

The ebb and flow of Germany's willingness to act

on its ambitions in the western hemisphere during the first
decade of the twentieth century were reflected in its activities in Mexico during that time.
Germans had settled in Mexico, and along the MexicanAmerican border, as early as the 1870's, 1 but their numbers
grew slowly.

By 1900 there only about 2,500 Germans in

J6
Mexico; in 1910, about J,6oo. 2

(By way of comparison, in

Brazil alone German immigration during this period totalled
almost 400,000, while U.S. nationals in Mexico in 1910 numbered about 4,000.)

They enjoyed an excellent reputation

among Mexicans for their energetic and scrupulous attention
to business.

The Merida Ecole Commercial, for instance,

wrote in December 1905 that "Among the foreign colonies,
the German is the one which has distinguished itself the
most for its honesty, decent behavior, and benevolence
toward Mexico and her sons.

~

Here in Yucatan, the German

colony is not large, but honest, occupies a distinguished
position, and is consequently highly respected and loved by
everyone."J

Five years later the Mexico City Nuevo echoed

these sentiments, saying, "The German colony

[in Mexico

City] is not the most numerous .•.. but we can state without
exaggeration that it is one of the most respected in our
land and one of the most popular." 4
German economic activity in Mexico was focused on the
central and southern regions,5 where the bulk of the population was concentrated.

Germany's small capital investment

and its commercial presence was concentrated mostly in the
mercantile trade, especially cotton goods, hardware, toys,
and the like.

Chemical products, electrical appliances, and

steel became more important after 1905. 6

By 1910, largely

because of the disproportionate influence of the well-placed
German merchant community, German products accounted for
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approximately 1J% of Mexican imports, second in importance
to the United States? and roughly equal to that of Great

Britain.
The German presence in Mexico was also felt in banking circles, where Germany's largest bank, the Deutsche
Bank, as well as several others, worked to facilitate
Mexican-German trade, finance German business in Mexico,
and conclude loans with the government.

In many cases Ger-

man bankers cooperated with their American counterparts to
their mutual advantage.

But German capital investment in

Mexico remained small (never more than 6.5% of total foreign
investment there), and, as a result, German commercial operations, with few exceptions, did not offer a serious competitive threat to American or British companies. 8 In fact,
German-American cartel arrangements tended to limit potential German growth.

It is true that by 1910 German concerns

were planning a more ambitious involvement in Mexican raw
materials, which might have significantly increased the
level of competition, but these plans were never realized.9

,.,.

Porfirio Diaz, who welcomed European investment to offset
the flood of American money entering Mexico, once remarked
that the Germans were too conservative in their Mexican
dealings, especially in the field of industrial investments. 10
In the sale of military weapons and technology, the
Germans experienced some success, but again did not make any

JS
spectacular gains.

There were several reasons for this,

perhaps the most important being the francophilia that was
so prevalent in Mexico's cientlfico circles.

Contracts for

military equipment were most often awarded to French concerns, at least in part because Manuel Mondragon, the War
Ministry's chief procurement officer, held a substantial
investment in a French munitions plant.

When General Ber-

nardo Reyes, a Germanophile, became the secretary of war in
1900, German hopes rose.

Reyes, who was awarded several

medals by the Gennans (including the prestigious Order of
the Red Eagle), did arrange several contracts for German
equipment, but after he resigned in 190), German prospects
for making significant inroads in this field disappeared. 11
As Minister Karl Bunz wrote some years later, "There is not
much to be hoped for from Mexico as long as Limantour
[n(az's financial wizard] and Mondragon control the country's finances and its army.

Both are oriented toward

France and not toward us. 1112
In spite of the pro-French tendencies of Mexico's
elite, however, certain aspects of German military influence
were evident in the Mexican armed forces.

At the Chapul-

tepec military school, for example, German military history
was preferred, and Gennan service regulations were employed;
the same was true at the officer school in Tlalpan, where,
in addition, the cadets wore German-style uniforms. 1 3 Only
a few Mexicans traveled to Germany for training, but of
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these, one later became the head of Diaz's mounted bodyguard, which as a result also received German-style training.

Partly because of the language barrier, then, German

influence on the Mexican military was small, but it did
exist, especially within the officer corps, and persisted
even after Di8.z's overthrow.

In 1914, for example, General

Aureliano Blanquet assured Franz von Papen (the German military attacheaccredited to both the United States and Mexico) that he trained his troops according to German
ods .14

meth-

Though limited, this early influence helps to ex-

plain the pro-German bias that would later appear within
Mexican military circles.
Germany's attempts to gain influence within the Mexican military were inevitably tied to its political and
diplomatic aims there.

These were relatively insignificant

before 1898, but then as German investment in Mexico increased, and especially because of the rising GermanAmerican rivalry, they assumed a more important role in German diplomatic strategy. 1 5 As such, German policy in Mexico
was guided by the same mixed motives, the same weighing of
opportunities and risks, that characterized its diplomacy as
a whole during this period.

In 1902, for example, the

Ger~

man Minister to Mexico, Hans von Wangenheim, proposed a plan
to infiltrate the Mexican army with German reservists.

The

Kaiser was "congenial" to the idea, and the German army
expressed its willingness to cooperate in the scheme.

But
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in this as in other risky ventures, the moderating influence of Bulow and Speck von Sternberg (the German ambassa-

dor to Washington) consigned it to the growing list of projects abandoned in the name of stable German-American relations .16
At about the same time, an American lawyer in London
informed Ambassador Choate that he had been approached by a
German who expressed interest in buying a large tract of
land in Baja, California near Magdalena Bay.

When pressed,

the German had stated that the real purchaser was none other
than the Kaiser himself, "in his personal and individual
capacity."

Choate reported the incident to Secretary Hay.

"We have a decidedly exposed flank there," he wrote, "and
it seems pretty clear that the property is for sale and that
the Germans are after it."

While Hay's action, if any, is

unknown, the purchase attempt was ultimately abandoned, most
likely due to the same considerations that had doomed other
such projects: Germany was increasingly unwilling to antagonize the United States. 1 7 When the German Far Eastern
naval squadron was scheduled to visit Mexico in 1904, the
German charge, Flecker, hoped to capitalize on the occasion
to arrange a German training program for Mexican naval
officers.

His plans were quashed by the Secretary of State,

who wrote that "such a step, for reasons involving our relations with the United States, appears to us to be inopportune.''

Flecker was further instructed to play down the
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significance of the German naval visit, so that it could
not "take on the character of a demonstration from which
the United States, and particularly the American press, can
draw the wrong conclusions."

As a result, when the fleet
~

did arrive Flecker did not even deliver to President Diaz
the commander's invitation to inspect the flagship. 18
Yet in spite of Germany's obvious desire to placate
opinion in the United States, the opportunistic streak that
lay beneath this conciliatory facade continued to influence
planning when circumstances seemed propitious for the aggressive advancement of the ideals of Weltpolitik.

The in-

tense Japanese-American tensions which followed the RussoJapanese War seemed to offer just such an opportunity.
Japan's dramatic victory over Russia put Americans on
notice that they had a surprisingly powerful and ambitious
rival in the Pacific, one that posed a potential danger to
American interests in East Asia and perhaps even to the
mainland itself.

Racist legislation in California, Japan's

increasingly aggressive posture in China, and Japanese sensitivities were among the other factors that combined to
carry the two nations close to war in 1906 and 1907.

Ger-

many acted to exacerbate these tensions, partly because of
the Kaiser's enthusiasm for action against the 'Yellow
Peril,' but also because Japanese-American animosity could
be exploited by Germany to its own best advantage.

Contin-

ued friction between Japan and America, Germany's rivals in
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East Asia and Latin America, could promote German interests
in several ways.

Germany hoped to gain a powerful ally in

the United States: but if this failed, animosity or war between its rivals would weaken their objections to Germany's
policies and provide openings for German advances while
America and Japan were preoccupied with each other.
During this time, therefore, Germany attempted to take
advantage of Japanese-American tensions to promote its own
interests in Mexico.

Mexico,could be developed into a

counterweight to the United States.

The Mexicans were also

alive to the possibility of using the Germans to strengthen
their hand against the United States, and tried to play off
Germany against the Americans.
In late 1906, for example, President Diaz and the governor of Mexico's Federal District called in Minister Wangenheim to tell him of their plans to begin a system of
universal military service in Mexico, and to inquire whether
Germany would be willing to send military advisers to Mexico to help with the project.

Wangenheim realized, he re-

ported to Bulow, that the "thrust of the military reform .••.
is aimed at the United States." 1 9 Yet he argued that the
idea held certain commercial and strategic advantages for
Germany.

Arms contracts would be more easily obtainable

for German firms, Wangenheim noted, but, in addition, a Mexican military power could "become a factor in military calculations involving the United States."

Hence, a "military
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friendship" with Mexico could have a "certain value" to
Germany.

"After all," he wrote, "World History is full of

aurprises." 20 As Warren Schiff writes, Wangenheim's argument foreshadowed some of the philosophy behind the famous
Zimmermann note.

But the contradictions of Germany's con-

voluted policy precluded any such action.

Recent events in

East Asia had encouraged Wilhelm to consider the idea of a
German-American alliance, and his unlikely reaction to Wangenheim' s report was that the United States might actually
welcome a Mexico strengthened by Germany.

In the event of a

clash between America and Japan, he noted, "America will be
pleased to have (Mexico] as a powerful ally." 21 The
Kaiser's illusions fortunately did not result in action on
the proposal.
Wangenheim, realizing that he had made a mistake, less
than a year later wrote that any plan to introduce German
advisers into Mexico would be misguided.

An important con-

sideration, Wangenheim argued, was the effect such a militarization of Mexico would have on the security of German
bondholders, who depended on a stable government in Mexico
and the ability of the United States to intervene in case
of trouble to maintain the value of their bonds.

This,

combined with the strains that a Mexican militarization
might place on its economy, convinced Wangenheim that German interests would be "better served by the [francophile)
Limantour regime and modest American surveillance than by a
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. d Mexican
.
reorganize
army. 22

Instead, he contended, Ger-

many's "sole task must be to avoid friction with the United
States all along the line, yet do our best to increase friction between the United States and other countries."
continued: 2 3

He

Mexico might have 400,000 well-armed and welltrained troops in ten years and thereby win a decided inf~uence on further developments in the
Western Hemisphere. A Mexico that had been strengthened by German aid could then perhaps become politically and militarily useful to us .•• but one
should depend on the tangible in politics and not
on a questionable greatness in the future.
When Japanese-American tensions reached their height in
1907, and it was learned that Mexico planned to meet with
French advisers, the idea was resurrected, but in 1908 as
the war scare ended, the plan was again abandoned. 24
In the meantime rumors were circulating which contended that thousands of Japanese reservists were infiltrating
into Mexico, ostensibly in preparation for a coming war with
the United States.

Wangenheim skeptically reported to Bu-

low in May, 1907 that "The Japanese are now spread throughout the country and are armed.

In the state of Chihuahua

there are currently 5,000 Japanese ready to bear arms and
an additional J, 000 in the state of Jalisc o • "

These re-

servists were supposed to have been seen practicing closeorder drill, and to be wearing uniforms, insignia, or both.
In July came another report, stating that "according to the
English consulate," thousands of Japanese were arriving
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every month, among them officers of general rank.

Wangen-

heim thought the truth of the rumors to be unlikely, but,

he noted, "It's not completely out of the question that
Japan might intend to make a landing in Mexico .•. " 25
The Kaiser not only accepted the rumors but passed
them on as fact after a little embellishment.

To Czar

Nicholas he wrote that the Japanese had massed ten thousand
troops in Mexico and planned to use them to attack the Panama Canal.

("This is my secret information for YOU PER-

SONALLY," he told "Nicky."

"It is sure information and

good as you well know by now that I never gave you a wrong
one.") 26
Meanwhile Theodore Roosevelt was receiving a series
of ominous telegrams from Charlemagne Tower, the U.S. ambassador in Berlin, which relayed German opinions concerning
the probability of a Japanese attack on the United States.
For example, Tower wrote in November that a German official
had told him that the Japanese were fully armed and "almost
ready to go to war," and that the Germans believed the Japanese would attack before the Panama Canal was finished. 2 7
Two months later, Tower transmitted the Kaiser's "facts"
concerning the 10,000 Japanese "with brass buttons on their
coats" drilling in Mexico in preparation for an attack on
the United States.

Roosevelt was not impressed, and called

the rumor an "imperial pipe dream"; nor was he interested in
a German offer to help repel a Japanese invasion of America
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with German troops. 28
Japanese diplomats, who had been busy trying to ease

Japanese-American tensions, rightly blamed Germany for inciting rumors and stirring up trouble between Japan and the
United States.

The Japanese ambassador to Washington, for

example, openly expressed his belief in 1908 that the Germans were deliberately attempting to poison JapaneseAmerican relations. 29 While German officials did believe
that a Japanese-American war was imminent,3° they did little
to ease tensions between the two countries and in fact often
seemed to be egging them on.

Thomas Bailey goes so far as

to label Wilhelm the "evil genius" of the period for his
role in promoting conflict between Japan and the United
States.3 1
The element of truth in this accusation becomes even
more apparent when the origins of another Japanese-American
war scare are examined.

In March of 1911, just as Francis-

co Madero's revolt against D1az began to gain its final
momentum, a strikingly consistent rumor began circulating
among diplomats that Japan and Mexico had concluded a secret treaty.3 2

When President Taft ordered 20,000 troops

to the Mexican border, the stories became more insistent,
and on April 9, the New York Sun ran a sensational article
on the subject with the headline "SECRET TREATY PHOTOGRAPH."
According to the Sun's story, President D1az had already
ratified the agreement, and Henry Lane Wilson, the American
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ambassador to Mexico, had acquired a copy.

Attempts by the

State Department to find the truth behind the story revealed
two facts:

H.L. Wilson denied ever having even seen the

treaty, and the Sun reporter who wrote it admitted that his
source was Herwarth von Bittenfeld, the German military
attacheto the United States and Mexico.33

Nonetheless the

scheme did succeed in creating some trouble between Japan
and the United States; many people, including the British
minister to Mexico, believed Taft's mobilization order was
a show of force to impress Japan, although this was definitely not the case.34
It is not known whether or not a secret treaty actually was concluded, but its existence seems unlikely.

The

strongest evidence that it did exist comes from the memoirs
of Horst von der Goltz, a German agent who later became the
chief of German intelligence efforts in Mexico.

In his

book Goltz claimed that he personally stole the treaty from
Limantour in Paris in classic cloak and dagger fashion and
supplied a copy of it to Henry Lane Wilson.35

Yet Goltz

seems prone to exaggeration, and Wilson denied that he ever
saw any treaty.

Other diplomats, including the Mexican am-

bassador to Japan, discounted the rumor.3 6

The Japanese

consul in Portland, Oregon supplied the most believable explanation in a dispatch to Tokyo137
One hears, for example, that this maneuver by American land and naval forces is aimed at restraining
Japanese intentions toward Mexico, and that the
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government's real target is not so much Mexico as
Japan. One hears that there are observers that
have seen 50,000 Japanese currently carrying out
military maneuvers on the Pacific Coast of Mexico

• • . and that Japanese warships have left Japan ...

headed for Mexico. One also hears that negotiations for an alliance are currently in progress
between Japan and Mexico. Various people cite the
view of German military expert Count Ernst von
Leventow that Japan will begin a war with the United States before the completion of the Panama Canal ...• The reports cited above are to be understood
as an attempt to whip up the local population's
hostility to Japan .•.. All this ... can be attributed
••. to the machinations of a third country, which
hopes to take advantage of America's estrangement
from Japan.
Obviously this "third country" was Germany.
This is not to say that the rumors linking Mexico and
Japan were entirely unfounded or simply the creation of German propaganda.

The Japanese had been systematically surveying the Mexican Pacific coast for some time,3 8 and American military planners, among others, were well aware that
the Mexican border was the "soft underbelly" of the United
States.

American military contingency plans assumed that a

Japanese invasion of the United States, if it ever occurred,
would cut through Mexico on the way to the Mississippi
Valley to slice the United States in half.

As General

Henry J. Reilly of Pershing's staff contended, "Every European and Asian General Staff which has studied a possible
war with the United States recognizes the great advantage
of an alliance with Mexico.39

Moreover, Japan deliberately

cultivated its relationship with Mexico, especially
under Diaz, which resulted in some exceptionally warm

49
expressions of friendship.

In April 1911, for example,

Grand Admiral Yashiro of the Japanese fleet made a state

visit to Mexico and was entertained at Chapultepec Palace
with a lavish banquet.

It was reported that after much

wine, Yashiro made a somewhat drunken speech in which he
stressed the two nations' common cause in opposing the
Yankees while his Mexican audience punctuated his talk with
enthusiastic applause and cries of "Viva Japan! Abaja las
Gringos!" 4 o The German propaganda campaigns exploited some
unquestionably strong feelings on all sides.

If Germany

did not create these tensions, it did what it could to
bring them to a boil.
The most intense Japanese-American tensions subsided
after 1908, however, and with them disappeared Germany's
hopes for a German-American alliance and its tentative and
rather contradictory plans for a more aggressive stance in
Mexico.

But the period from 1906-1911, as contradictory as

it was for German policymakers, marked the beginning of an
interesting trend in German planning concerning the United
States and Mexico.

Having had to abandon for the time being

the idea of a direct conflict with America, and finding that
the United States was not interested in an alliance, Germany
began to resort to a variation of "jackal diplomacy" by
attempting to pit its rivals against other powers.

Barbara

Vogel described this strategy as "Weltpolitik without war,
but with the war of others!" 41 One possibility considered
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was to strengthen Mexico to provide a counterweight to the
United States, but this was judged too risky.

Another

possible break tor Germany, a conflict between the United
States and Japan, did not materialize when expected, even
when encouraged by rumormongering and Wilhelm's tactless if
not ingenuous warnings concerning the imminent danger of the
Yellow Peril.
Still, the strategy itself was basically sound from
Germany's point of view, and it remained a tool of German
policy.

With Germany's "free hand" to independently pursue

world power increasingly paralyzed, "Weltpolitik with the
wars of others" was an attractive expedient.

Using this

tactic Germany could indirectly work to achieve its aggressive ambitions, yet risk little prestige or goodwill.

More-

over, tensions between other·nations could divert attention
from Germany's more overt activities and perhaps even make
it a more attractive ally.

In a sense, this strategy repre-

sented an attempt to resolve the conflicting demands of
German policys it was designed to opportunistically exploit
international tensions to change the status quo in Germany's
favor while allowing a relatively low diplomatic profile.
"Weltpolitik with the wars of others" carried its own risks,
however.

If implemented indiscretely or obtusely, it could

awaken suspicion, resentment, and even hostility within the
very nations it hoped to neutralize.
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CHAPTER III
NEW ELEMENTS: THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION, GERMANY,
AND THE UNITED STATES,
1911-1914
Francisco I. Madero certainly did not match anyone's
conception of a Mexican strongman.

He was, as T.R. Fehren-

bach put it, "a little man barely measuring five feet,
bird-like and quivering, with a high pitched, squeaky
voice." 1 A confirmed vegetarian, Madero practiced homeopathy and had been converted to spiritualism during his
adolescent days in: France.

His dark,

p~netrating

eyes, un-

impeachable honesty, and almost uncanny ability to remain
composed under even the most chaotic circumstances complete
a portrait of a highly unusual caudillo.

Yet this was the

man who pushed Porfirio Diaz out of Mexico's presidential
chair with relative ease.
Madero, a wealthy hacendado, had been relatively unknown before the publication of his book, The Presidential
Succession of 1910.

Its enormous success convinced him to

run against Diaz in 1910 on the Anti-Reelectionist Party
ticket.

Madero simply advocated a program of peaceful,

democratic succession, but his opposition to Diaz attracted
an enthusiastic response from the many Mexicans dissatisfied
with the dictatorship.

Don Porfirio, who was out of touch
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with the mood of the country, did not take his opponent
very seriously.

He had Madero arrested as a precautionary

measure, and then declared himself the winner of the election with 99% of the vote.
Madero's escape in October and his subsequent revolt
only increased the little reformer's popularity, however.
The rebellion spread quickly.

On May 26, 1911, Diaz boarded

a ship headed for France, but with some prophetic parting
words for Mexico.

"Madero has unleashed a tiger," he said.
"Let us see if he can control him." 2
Two weeks later Madero rode triumphantly into Mexico

City and was greeted by a reception that one American observer described as "one of the most remarkable in all history .... three days of plaudits and admiration such as only
the Roman emperor knew."

The people saw Madero as their

"messiah," she said, and crowded the rooftops along his
route "throwing flowers and green branches as he passed."3
After an overwhelming electoral victory, Madero became president of Mexico on November 11, 1911.
In spite of its auspicious beginnings, however, Madero's presidency was rocky and tumultuous, and ended with
his arrest and murder only fifteen months after he took
office.

His successful overthrow of the Dia.z regime had in-

deed taken the cork out of the bottle and released forces
he could not or would not control.

Madero's domestic diffi-

culties were compounded by his poor relations with the
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diplomatic community in Mexico City, especially the American ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson, who came to detest Madero and his policies and eventually worked actively to remove him from the presidency.
German policy with regard to Mexico during the regimes
of Madero and his successor,

Victo~iano

Huerta, was multi-

faceted and complex, but in general it was designed to promote Germany's world policy objectives and to maximize protection for German nationals, investments, and trade from
dangers posed by revolutionary violence.

This translated

into acquiescence to American policy, though not support
for it, bacause Germany hoped to remain on good terms with
the United States but did not relish the idea of American
military intervention.

During Madero's presidency, these

considerations caused Paul von Hintze, the German minister,
to work closely with the American ambassador.

President

Woodrow Wilson's moralistic attempts to dislodge Huerta,
Madero's successor, however, brought an end to this confluence of interests.

As Kaiser Wilhelm remarked, the

"stand for morality" was "all right," but " what about
dividends?" 4
That Rear Admiral Paul von Hintze was appointed in
1911 to be Germany's new minister to Mexico at all is an
indication of the growing importance given the Mexican post
by his superiors.

Hintze (a future Foreign Minister) was

considered to be one of the most competent German diplomats.
Moreover, he was a confidant of the Kaiser, whom he had
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served as a personal emissary to Russia; and preceding his
assignment to Mexico, he was Wilhelm's aide-de-camp.

Hintze

was a pan-Germanist in sympathies, and hie field of expertise was East Asian affairs.

Years earlier, he had served

under Admiral Diederichs during the Manila crisis and had
been the German officer at whom Dewey had shouted "If your
admiral wants a fight he can have it now!"5

A man of

Hintze's caliber was apparently thought to be necessary to
handle Germany's delicate position in revolutionary Mexico.
During Madero's presidency, with the constant possibility of an American intervention, this meant that Hintze
had to "dance on eggs" in both economic and political
matters.

More precisely, Germany was unwilling to take any

overt action against the United States there alone.

"The

European countries," Hintze wrote, "all live with the fear
of coming into open conflict with the policies of the United
States." 6

Even when the Americans pressed Madero for a

reciprocity treaty, which could have placed German imports
at a distinct disadvantage there, the German response was
low key.

As Secretary of State

Alfred von Kiderlen-

W~chter wrote Hintze in 1911, "for our policy in Mexico our

general guideline is to defend German interest energetically, but, aside from that, to do everything we can to keep a
low profile.

We also hold to this policy on the question

of the American efforts at the reciprocity agreement.
means we use to fight them must be applied covertly

The
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wherever possible." 7

As a result, Hintze's actions on this

question were minimal; he unsuccessfully attempted surrep-

titiously to place pro-German articles in the Mexican press,
and encouraged German bankers to ask for Mexican assurances
in their loan negotiations that no reciprocity agreement
would be concluded.

As it turned out, the American reci-

procity overtures were not accepted by the Madero government, but Germany's opinion on the matter had little to do
with the decision. 8
The same considerations determined Germany's political
stance in Mexican affairs at this time.

Minister Hintze's

instructions actually specified that Germany had no political interests in Mexico.

"If I understand the instructions

properly," Hintze replied, "this means that Germany's relation to Mexico's political orientation is that of observation and waiting."9

Even friendly gestures by the Mexican

government did not shake this opinion.

When Francisco Leon

de la Barra, the provisional president before Madero took
office, told Hintze that "Mexico's foreign policy will aim
at reliance on Europe and especially on Gennany," Hintze
did not pursue the matter.

In fact, he suggested to Chan-

cellor Bethmann-Hollweg that Gennany's neutral position be
spelled out to de la Barra "to avoid any dangers raised by
silence or even ambiguity."lO
Yet in spite of this great reluctance to antagonize
the United States, Germans continued to work behind the
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scenes to advance their country's interests.

In 1911, for

example, a certain German businessman, Mardus, proposed to
Madero that Mexico institute a system of universal military
service, with the army to be trained along German lines and
supplied with German military equipment.

Mardus explained

that political realities argued against direct German involvement: "Since Germany must avoid a war with the United
States, as long as the English Bulldog is squatting at the
German gates in the form of a larger fleet," he said, "Germany should not tempt the powerful Yankee, who speaks so
lightly of war." 11 Instead, he offered an indirect arrangement whereby the Mexicans would be trained by instructors
from Chile, where the German army already exerted influence
and whose army had already sent military advisers to several
other Latin American countries.

In addition, Mardus sugges-

ted that a number of Mexicans join the German army in secret to become familiar with its methods and organization.
Madero seems to have been impressed with the plan and apparently considered the possibility of implementing it: in
September of 1912 the Mexican military attache in Chile was
ordered to conduct research "on how the German military system can be adopted by a La.tin American country." 12 The extent of the German Foreign Office's knowledge or approval of
this plan is unknown, but it does signify that the German
efforts to extend their influence in Mexico had not come to
a complete standstill.
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Moreover, Herwarth von Bittenfeld, the German military attache in Washington who had planted the "secret
treaty" story in the New York Sun, continued to encourage
U.S.-Japanese tensions over Mexico.

In February of 1912 an

anonymous article entitled "A Letter to Uncle Sam" appeared
in the Atlantic Monthly in which the author argued that
only "an alliance of the white race" could stop the "Yellow
Peril."

In addition, the author contended that the Monroe

Doctrine was an "anachronism" that would eventually have to
be abandoned south of Panama; the United States would need
"Germany's prestige" to enforce it farther south.

He also
touched on the question of Japanese influence in Mexico: 1 3
In spite of all denials, Japan is flirting with
Mexico •.•. Japan would like to make Mexico into a
base for the protection of its interests on this
continent ••.. If Mexico actually responds to the
Japanese siren song, then we Lthe United States]
must take over Mexico.
Bittenfeld was enthusiastic about the article and
sent a copy to his superiors in Berlin, saying it was the
"first swallow" in a new American orientation.

He also

sent part of his report on the article to the New York Sun,
which printed it under the byline of "Germanicus."

Here

Bittenfeld argued that a coalition of the United States,
Germany and Britain could "divide the world among themselves
and place a distance between themselves and the upwardstriving colored peoples which will last forever." 14
Efforts of this sort sometimes generated counterpro-

ductive results.

In 1912 Manuel Calero, the Mexican foreigr.

minister, bitterly complained to Hintze of Germany's "ultra-

Machiavellianism." He had information, he said, from "wellinformed" sources, that "Germany is pushing the United
States to intervene in Mexico in hopes of tying up the United States in a long-term war and thereby make it an object
of hatred for all of Latin America.

While the United States

is caught in this snare, Germany wants to emerge as the
savior of the Latin American countries and to begin settlements and annexations there." 1 5
Hintze vehemently denied the allegation, calling it
"the height of poor taste and ••. unnecessary to waste time
or words on ... "

"I was forced to lecture

Calero

on his-

tory," he reported, "to prove that Germany's interests have
always been congruent or parallel to Mexico's.
succeeded in defusing the story." 16

I think I

The source of this rumor is unknown, but it is clear
that the policy to which Calero referred is strikingly parallel to the actual course German policy would follow in
later years, and that it bears a certain resemblance to the
hopeful scenarios concocted by Bittenfield and other Germans
in which the power of the United States would be neutralized
or diverted for Germany's benefit. Friedrich Katz 1 7 argues
that the truth of the rumor is "unlikelyu because German
policy at the time aimed to prevent the United States from
intervening in Mexico and because Germany's increasingly

tense relations with Great Britain would prevent the German
Empire from unilaterally exploiting such an opportunity to

expand its influence in South America.

But Germany's poli-

cies during this time were often contradictory, and, as we
shall see, Germany approached Great Britain concerning a
joint military intervention (which would have been a much
more serious matter) as late as July 1914.

While it is

possible, then, that the rumor was the product of an overimaginative American mind, the possibility that it was the
result of a Teutonic brainstorm should not be dismissed out
of hand.

In any case, the very fact that Calero would re-

act so strongly to the rumor is an indication that the Mexican foreign minister, at least, took it very seriously,
and that Gennany's motives were highly suspect in the eyes
of certain diplomats.
As Madero's presidency was threatened by a series of
revolts by both revolutionary and counterrevolutionary factions, Hintze, like Henry Lane Wilson, became increasingly
discouraged about Madero's inability to provide order and
stability in Mexico, which threatened the lives and interests of foreign nationals.

Emiliano Zapata and his follow-

ers continually harassed Madero's troops in a guerilla war
in Morelos to force concessions on land reform, while the
right-wing generals Bernardo Reyes and Felix Diaz began
abortive coups in Tamaulipas and Veracruz.

The most serious

threat to the government was led in 1912 by Pascual Orozco,

----
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a disgruntled revolutionary with conservative backing, but
Orozco's rebellion was also crushed by federal troops.
Some observers saw hope

in Madero'a consistent sue-

cess in dealing with the uprisings.

Sir James Strange, the

British minister to Mexico, reported in September of 1912:
"Personally I believe the present state of affairs is very
much what was to be expected, and that things will gradually
improve, unless they should be disturbed by some unforseen
incident." 18
Henry Lane Wilson, however, reported the situation in
increasingly gloomy terms and began to attack Madero bitterly in his dispatches and to the press.

At one point he

publicly declared that Madero should be committed to a madhouse.19

Privately, Wilson expressed his belief that U.S.

military intervention was called for, and on one occasion
the State Department strongly rebuked him for sounding out
the British ambassador on the matter. 20 By the spring of
1912 Wilson was completley disgusted with the direction of
Madero's policies and with Madero's failure to act on his
advice.

An American diplomat's wife wrote in April that

"Mr. W. [Wilson] has been so convinced from the beginning
that Madero could not fill the position that he has lost
interest in personal communications. 1121
Minister Hintze, too, believed Madero was unequal to
the task.

He reported that Madero's "cardinal error lies

in his ••• belief that he can rule the Mexican people as one
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would rule one of the more advanced Germanic nations.

This

raw people of half-savages without religion, with its small
ruling stratum of auperficially civilized mestizos, can live
with no regime other than enlightened despotism." (the
Kaiser's margin note: "Right!") 22 Hintze and Wilson came
to agree that Mexico needed a strong leader of the Porfirian
stripe to save Mexico from anarchy.

In Hintze's view, "the

little conspirators, people who anywhere else would be
known only as scoundrels---the De la Barras, the Flores
Magons, and so on---have neither the moral nor physical
courage to strike.

All that remains for a revolution having

any hope of success is once again the army, naturally, under
a leader of a higher caliber than the theatrical Felix
Diaz."

The name of Hintze's candidate for the position be-

gan to creep into his dispatches, a general who "many viewed
as a strongman"---Victoriano Huerta. 2 3
On Sunday, February 9, 1912, the meticulously planned
coup that eventually unseated Madero began to unfold.

Col-

umns of military cadets and troops loyal to Felix D~z
marched to the military prison and the penitentiary.

,,,,
Diaz

and Bernardo Reyes, imprisoned for their earlier revolts,
were released without resistance, and the rebels proceeded
to the National Palace, where they were opposed by General
Luaro Villar, the loyal Federal commander.

After a brief

fight, the attackers were repulsed, and, led by Felix Diaz,
they moved on to take the Ciudadela, the federal fortress
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near the center of Mexico City.

General Reyes was killed

in the attack; Villar was seriously

wou~ded.

The Decena

Trajica, the Ten Tragic Days, had begun.
For the next eight days General Diaz and his troops
held the Ciudadela, while hundreds of government soldiers
died in useless frontal assaults on the rebel's position.
The streets were littered with the unrecoverable bloated
bodies of dead soldiers and civilians caught in artillery
and machine

gu~

cross fire.

General Victoriano Huerta, whom

Madero had appointed to replace the injured Villar, was ac~

tually in secret communication with Diaz from the first day
of the coup, and the bloody battles were only a cynical ruse
to stall for time while the two generals negotiated for
power. 24
Wilson and Hintze saw the situation as a unique opportunity to replace Madero, and they, together with the Spanish and British ministers, cooperated officially and unofficially during this time by explicitly withdrawing their
support for Madero and implicitly supporting the coup.

Most

accounts of the Decena Trajica justly condemn the American
ambassador's high-handed and fateful encouragement of the
rebels, which was so blatant that the Cuban minister later
called the American embassy a "center of conspiracy; 112 .5 but,
as Peter Calvert points out, too little attention is given
to the roles played by other foreign diplomats. 26

As Amer-

ican ambassador and "dean" of the diplomatic community in
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Mexico City, Wilson naturally took precedence, but it was
the cooperation of the British, Spanish, and German diplo-

mats that enabled him to justify many of his actions on
the grounds that he spoke for the
whole.

11

diplomatic corps" as a

(Representatives of Latin American countries were

apparently not consulted in any of the decisions made by
the "corps" during this time.)
An important factor behind the joint effort was the
terrifying danger of the battle itself, which threatened the
nearby embassies and seemed to many to be the final proof of
Madero's weaknesses.

The Spanish minister, Bernardo Cologon

y Cologon, was justifiably concerned for the safety of the
very large Spanish population for which he was responsible;
he himself had been through the siege of Peking and did not
wish to repeat the experience. 2 7 Sir Francis Strange, the
British minister, was a somewhat timid character whose sensitivity to violence was no doubt reinforced when his car
was stopped and robbed by a group of renegade federal soldiers. 28

Strenge may also have had economic motives for his
support of Wilson's position. 29 In any case, Cologon and

Strange joined with Wilson and Hintze on February

15 in sug-

gesting that Madero resign and in other ways let it be known
that they shared Wilson's animosity towards Madero's government.

Cologon, for example, encouraged federal army officers

to refuse to fight for Madero,JO while Strange went so far
as to suggest to Wilson American threats of intervention.3 1
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Hintze's role was also significant, and this episode
provides an interesting example of American and German interests in

Mexico in simultaneous congruence and conflict.

In his memoirs, Henry Lane Wilson himself singled out Hintze
as a valuable collaborator in the unfolding diplomatic drama :32
I formed a high opinion of Admiral von Hintze from
the first moment of our acquaintance and this opinion I had no occasion to modify subsequently.
Through all the trying hours of the revolutions
against Diaz and Madero, culminating in the bombardment of the City of Mexico, his sympathy and
advice were of infinite value. While the bombardment was in progress he was especially active and
supported me in every crisis with unswerving courage and absolute disregard of every consideration
except the faithful performance of the duties pertaining to his high office.
During the days of the Decena Tra'Jica Hintze conspicuously
accompanied H.L. Wilson on several visits to Madero, Diaz,
and Huerta, demonstrating his solidarity with Wilson's diplomatic initiatives by his presence if not his words.

But

Hintze's "sympathy" for Wilson's actions had its limits.
As we have seen, Hintze was interested in replacing Madero
with a "strongman" who could establish a semblance of order
in Mexico.

He and the American ambassador were in complete

agreement on this point, which was the foundation of their
cooperation, but they differed in their estimations of who
that successor should be.

As a result, their actions took

parallel courses until Hintze came to believe that Wilson
wanted to install the supposedly pro-American Felix Diaz in
the presidency.

Hintze, of course, had no wish to see a
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pro-American regime in power. Moreover, he had little re,,
spect for Diaz, whom he described in dispatches to Berlin

as unintelligent and "more impulsive than strong ... JJ On
February 17, the day before Madero was arrested, Hintze reported to his superiors in Berlin: "American ambassador
,,,
working openly for Diaz, told Madero in my presence he is
doing so because Diaz is pro-American.

This partisanship

is making the activities of the diplomatic corps difficult ... Am working with all energy solely for the protection
of Germans, am otherwise distancing muself from other American requests without actual clashes."34

The same day,

hoping to sidetrack the efforts of the American ambassador,
Hintze took steps to promote Huerta's chances.

Without

notifying Wilson, he approached Pedro Lascurain, the foreign minister, with a plan to install Huerta as "Governor
General of Mexico, with full powers to end the revolution
according to his own judgment."

Lascurain took the idea to

Madero, who by this time was struggling against a wave of
requests for his resignation and Wilson's intimidating
(and unauthorized) threats of American intervention.

Some

time later Lascurain returned with the news that Madero had
"essentially accepted" the arrangement, but that Huerta
would not necessarily be his choice for governor.

Hintze

then made his position clear, saying "every minute counts,
and that it seems to me Huerta is the only man with sufficient prestige in the army.

The selection of some one
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else---who is perhaps weaker---would be a serious mistake." 35

But Madero's fatal optimism scotched the proposal.
Buoyed by an encouraging telegram from President Taft which
denied any American intentions of intervention, and by the
arrival of new troops, Madero believed he could ride out
the trouble.3 6

On the morning of the 18th, he tersely re-

fused a group of senators asking for his resignation, saying, "I will never resign.

The people have elected me,

and I will die, if necessary, in the fulfillment of my obligation ... 37

Only hours later Madero was arrested at gun-

point by General Blanquet, and Victoriano Huerta announced
that he had assumed the executive power.
That night the two contending generals met at the
American embassy to hammer out the details of an agreement.
H.L. Wilson's sympathies were obvious; he shouted "Long
live Felix Di8.z, saviour of Mexico!" as his favorite entered the door.3 8 But Wilson was not match for Huerta, who
knew he had the upper hand in the negotiations and, in any
case, it was enough for Wilson that Madero would be replaced.

After a "triangular discussion," as Wilson later

described it, Felix Dla.z walked out with nothing to show
for his efforts but Huerta's empty promise of support in
the next elections.

Both Wilson and Hintze had reason to

be gratified with the results.
Two days later, after having tendered their resigna-
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tions, Madero and his vice-president were "shot while trying to escape" while being transferred to the penitentiary.

The actual extent of Huerta's responsibility for the murders
has never been satisfactorily determined, but Madero's death
and the patently false official explanation (which almost
nobody believed) left a stain on Huerta's administration
that severely damaged his chances for successful rule, as
well as his supporters' hopes for the establishment of order in Mexico.

Though at first Huerta's backers believed

that he could rally foreign and domestic support, Madero's
murder crystallized domestic opposition to Huerta and
brought down upon his administration the moralistic wrath
of the new president of the United States, Woodrow Wilson.
Notwithstanding an oblique promise in the "Embassy
Pact" to address the "agrarian question," Huerta's seizure
of power did nothing to quell the revolt in Morelos, although a few Zapatistas did hail the new government.39
More ominously, large-scale opposition to Huerta began to
form in the north under the Constitutionalist banner of
Venustiano Carranza, who allied his movement with a growing
insurrection in Chihuahua headed by Pancho Villa.

On March

26 Carranza issued the "Plan de Guadalupe," which denounced
Huerta as a traitor, named Carranza the "First Chief of the
Constitutionalist Anny," and proclaimed his intention to
oust Huerta from the presidency. 40 The Constitutionalist
cause steadily attracted followers (though Zapata was not
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among them), and in October the Constitutionalists established their own provisional

government~

Woodrow Wilson's attitude toward Huerta's regime was
encapsulated in his private remark, "I will not recognize
a government of butchers." 41 Convinced by reports from his
confidential agent, William B. Hale, that Huerta was indeed
responsible for Madero's death, the President began a series
of moves intended to remove Huerta from the presidency.
At first President Wilson hoped the application of
diplomatic and economic pressure would convince Huerta to
step down voluntarily.

In July, Henry Lane Wilson, who had

been urging the State Department to recognize Huerta, was
recalled and not replaced; non-recognition would make it
difficult for Huerta to obtain financing.

The charge; Nel-

son O'Shaughnessy, would handle American affairs in Mexico.
And, since O'Shaughnessy was not considered to be entirely
reliable, 42 his efforts were supplemented by the assignment
of a series of trusted "confidential agents" to conduct
more delicate negotiations and report on the situation in
general.
In August, Wilson sent John Lind, the third "confidential agent" to visit Mexico City, to needle Huerta with
promises and threats.

Lind offered Huerta a "simple" solu-

tion to his problem: if Huerta would hold new elections and
exclude himself from office, the United States would confer
recognition and provide the Mexican government with a
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sizeable loan.

If not, Lind threatened, the United States

would either intervene militarily or recognize the increas-

ingly powerful Constitutionalist rebels who had promised
to fight Huerta to the death.

Huerta at first refused to

consider these threats and bribes, but by late August a
settlement seemed possible.

Huerta's secretary of foreign

affairs commented to Lind that the Mexican constitution prohibited Huerta from succeeding himself in any case; and in
September, Huerta stated his "ardent desire to turn [the]
government over to a constitutional successor."

When Huer-

ta's secretary of state was nominated for the presidency by
the Catholic Party, Wilson's secretary of state, William
Jennings Bryan, wrote his President that "I feel we have
nearly reached the end of our trouble." 4 3 But if Huerta had
ever actually intended to step down, Wilson's hopes were
dashed and his anger roused by the events of October 12,
when Huerta strengthened his internal position by imprisoning 112 Mexican deputies.

"Huerta," O'Shaughnessy reported,
may now be considered an absolute military dictator." 44
The true dimensions of Wilson's dilemma became even
clearer the next day, when Sir Lionel Carden, the new British ambassador to Mexico, presented his credentials to the
dictator.

Britain had recognized Huerta as early as March

15, but Carden's move seemed to demonstrate the strength of

Britain's support for this regime and highlighted the already obvious divergence of American and European policies
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with respect to Huerta's Mexico.

Wilson's "missionary

diplomacy," 4 5 his determination to teach the Mexicans to

elect good leaders, reflected the President's urge to spread
the blessings of democracy and Christian principles, 46 but
it also caused the United States to become increasingly
mired in Mexico's frustrating domestic disputes and threatened to produce serious frictions between the United States
and other nations with interests in Mexico.
Wilson's early condemnation of Huerta's regime had not
been shared in European capitals, where it was generally
believed that Huerta would offer a better chance for Mexican stability than Madero had been able to provide.

And,

to the Europeans, more attached to traditional diplomatic
recognition procedures, the "morality" of Huerta's coup was
not the final criterion of the legitimacy of his regime.
The fundamental question.was whether or not he could reasonably be expected to remain in power and fulfill Mexico's
international obligations. 4 7 When it became clear that this
was the case, Britain recognized the new Mexican goverrunent;
other European nations, including Germany, soon followed
suit, as did several Latin American countries.

This had

irritated Woodrow Wilson somewhat, but the news of Huerta's
expulsion of the opposition deputies, combined with Lind's
reports that Carden had somehow influenced Huerta to ignore
the wishes of the United States, threw him into a rage.

On

his own typewriter Wilson composed the outline for a heated
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circular dispatch accusing certain European powers of supporting Huerta "without regard to the wishes of the United

States." Wilson wanted to know whether these powers would
support the United States policy or "is it their policy
and intention to antagonize and thwart us and make our task
one of domination and force?"

He wanted the British to

know that "the bottom was about to drop out when Sir Lionel
Carden appeared upon the scene and took charge of its rehabilitation. "48

In fact, the proposed note charged that

recognition of Huerta was a violation of the Monroe Doctrine,
and demanded that the European powers withdraw recognition
of Huerta "in behalf of the people of the Western hemisphere. "49
The spirit behind this message emerged two days later
in Wilson's Mobile address, delivered October 21.

This

speech, which was intended to outline Wilson's policy in
Latin America, was also laced with barely veiled attacks on
Britain's Mexican policy, which, Wilson contended, was motivated by its "sordid" material interests there.5°

His

promise that the United States would never seek "one additional foot" of territory in Mexico was a sly reminder that
American military intervention had not yet been ruled out.5 1
Colonel House, the President's "alter ego," thought the
speech was great, but Europeans had a different reaction.
A Berlin paper labeled Wilson's ideas "imperialistic delirium . .. 52

75

Fortunately for Wilson, the blustering circular he
had written earlier was never distributed.

John Bassett

Moore, the State Department's Counselor, had refused to
send it, and on Wilson's return to Washington Moore took
the occasion to instruct his President on the basics of
diplomatic practice.

"Recognition is an act performed in

the ordinary course of diplomatic relations," Moore reminded the President, adding, "There is nothing in the record
to show that the governments that recognized the administration at the city of Mexico in May, June, or July last felt
they were doing anything unusual or requiring explanation ...•
Nor had the United States said anything to indicate to them
that it entertained a different view."53

Wilson agreed to

withhold the note, but nonetheless began to increase diplomatic pressure on the Europeans, especially Britain, in
other ways.5 4
Despite their differences with Wilson, neither the
Germans nor the British believed themselves to be in any
position to openly defy America's Mexican policy, at least
not alone.

To be sure, the Europeans did not agree with

the thrust of Wilson's Mexico policy.

Ousting Huerta made

little sense from their point of view; it seemed to be a
foolish and dangerous policy, especially since the Americans contended that they had no replacement for him in
mind.55

Therefore, if Wilson was suspicious of European

aims in Mexico, European diplomats tended to be equally
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suspicious of American motives.

This was as true of the

British as the Germans.
Just prior to his departure for his new post in Mexico, Carden wrote a long letter to his foreign secretary,
Sir Edward Grey, in which he outlined the Mexican situation
as he saw it.

He began by asserting that the United States

had extended the Monroe Doctrine "up to the point of implying a right of suzerainty over Latin America," and that
"far from favoring the principle of the open door" there,
the Americans used "all their influence" to gain special
privileges for their own trade.

Eventually, Carden conten-

ded, this would result in the United States acquiring "a
great preponderance if not a virtual monopoly in all matters
connected with finance, commerce, or public works" in Latin
America.

He went on to describe the "ineptitude and bad

faith" of the United States in Mexico, and concluded that
"it would seem to be madness at such a juncture to contemplate substituting a new and untried man, for the present
Provisional President, who from all reports is proving himself thoroughly competent to dominate the situation ... 5 6
Carden was well known for his anti-American views, but
it is significant that the Prime Minister commented that
"Sir L. Carden's picture of American policy and methods in
Mexico does not seem at all over-coloured."57

Grey, the

foreign secretary, was also inclined to agree, but in his
reply to Carden he emphasized Britain's awkward position in
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Mexico: "I do not dispute the inconvenience and untoward
results of United States policy, but whi1e I am prepared to
keep a free hand, His Majesty's government cannot with any
prospect of success embark upon an active counter-policy to
that of the United States ... 5 8
Britain was in a difficult position.

Troubles in the

Middle East, in Ireland, and the increasing tensions with
Germany argued against becoming involved in a major confrontation with the United States over Mexico.

Moreover, the

Royal Navy, which had been converted to oilburners in 1912,
was dependent for fuel on the Mexican oilfields around Tampico, which by 1913 ranked behind only the U.S. and Russia
in world oil production.59

The protection of these fields

was therefore a primary British concern.

Both British and

American warships patrolled the area, but these were hardly
proof against the constant danger of deliberate or accidental destruction by rebels or even government troops.
In addition, the Constitutionalist rebels had made it
clear that they would not recognize the validity of any oil
concessions contracted with Huerta, "the usurper. 1160 It
behooved the British, then, to remain on decent terms with
Huerta, who had shown that he could and would make major
efforts to protect the fields. 61 These problems were compounded when it was discovered in late 1913 that most of the
oil produced by British-owned Aguila Oil Company, which
held the navy contract, was unfit for fuel purposes; to
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fulfill its contract, the company had to buy oil from
American-owned wells in Mexico. 62

Thus, in spite of Brit-

ain's tremendous interest in a pacified Mexico, it could
scarcely profit from overly antagonizing the United States,
even though American policy seemed tailored to prolong the
hostilities there.
For these reasons, which were reinforced by Wilson's
promises to protect British interests in Mexico and his
willingness to make concessions on the Panama Canal tolls
question, Britain openly announced that it had no intention
of opposing American policy in Mexico, 6 J and in November

1913 informed Huerta that it could not support him against
the wishes of the United States. 64
Like Britain, Germany believed Huerta was the best
available answer to Mexico's problems, but it was even less
willing to oppose Wilson's line, partly because of Germany's
increasingly precarious position in Europe but also because
its investments in Mexico did not approach the magnitude
and importance of Britain's.

On the other hand, German

policymakers had no intention of actually cooperating with
the United States there.

Open resistance to the wishes of

the United States was often contemplated and sometimes practiced, but only in collaboration with Britain and other
nations; and even then the risks of a direct confrontation
were assiduously avoided.

As a result, Germany's public

diplomatic stance with respect to Mexico during Huerta's
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regime tended toward caution, indirection, and evasion to
make the most of an extremely delicate situation.
While Britain had informed the State Department as
early as March 13 of its intentions to recognize Huerta's
government, for example, Germany did not declare its intentions until May 15, by which time several other nations,
including France, Spain, Austria-Hungary, Colombia, and
China, had already done so. 65

Because of Henry Lane Wil-

son's enthusiastic approval of Huerta, Hintze was actually
a bit skeptical of Huerta at first, believing that the new
man might be in the Ambassador's pocket. 66
was quickly dispelled.

But this fear

Rudolph von Kardorff, who took over

as charge for a number of months while Hintze was ill, had
nothing but praise for Huerta, which was echoed by the Kaiser.

Kardorff described Huerta's speech at the April 2nd

opening of the Mexican congress with classic Teutonic
reverence: 6 7
Huerta had done what no one else had been able to
do for months. He had instilled confidence. Confidence with respect. The old soldier, who may not
have asked his savior ~or counsel too often in the
past, had spoken of God, had implored the higher
powers and taken them as his own .•.. In one's heart
the conviction took hold: in the breast of this old
soldier there resides both will and love for the
fatherland, a clear instinct for what is useful in
the moment and capacity for imagination, cleverness,
and no over bearing scruples.
To this, Wilhelm noted: "Bravo! such a man has our sympathies. u 68
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Kardorff was a blunter man than Hintze, and far less
capable of employing nuance and diplomatic finesse in carrying out his duties.

This led to insensitive displays on his

part that no doubt left some with the impression that German
policy in Mexico had become overly assertive or even aggressive.

In mid-April, for instance, Kardorff was approached

by Henry Lane Wilson, who was hoping for German-American
cooperation concerning Huerta's recognition.

Hintze earlier

had given Ambassador Wilson some reason to believe that
joint action might be possible, but Kardorff, as he reported, gruffly treated Wilson's "astounding" proposal with
"the appropriate contempt." 69

Similarly, Kardorff was not

averse to publicly stating his support for Huerta's regime.
As late as September, when Woodrow Wilson's antipathy toward Huerta was well known, Kardorff declared at a banquet
that he had "complete confidence" in the dictator.7°
The charge's publicly anti-American stance cannot be
entirely attributed to his blunt personality, however.

Un-

til November 191), Germany was more confident in the knowledge that its pro-Huerta stance was shared, and to some
degree overshadowed, by Great Britain's equally strong
support for Wilson's

b~te

noire. Germany welcomed company in

Mexico, for only in collaboration with other European powers
could it oppose the United States.

In July, Kardorff had

cooperated with other European delegates in Mexico in send-
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ing an anti-American resolution to their respective governments.

The Kaiser wholeheartedly agreed: "good," he wrote,

"finally unity against the Yankee."

In August, Ambassador

von Bernstorff even suggested to the State Department that
the United States should recognize Huerta after all; but,
significantly, he did so only after learning that his British colleague had made a similar overture.7 1
This increasing willingness to stand up against U.S.
policy was not lost on American diplomats in Berlin.

Ambas-

sador Gerard wrote Secretary Bryan that Germany regarded
Huerta as a "man of determination"7 2 while Joseph Grew, also
of the American embassy there, wrote in August that it was
"unfortunately clear that the views of the German government
in Berlin are diametrically opposed to those of the United
States." 73

At one point it was even feared that the in-

ability of the United States to protect German nationals in
Mexico might induce Germany "to take some drastic action" to
ensure their safety.74

In fact, however, German action a-

long these lines was confined to the dispatch of the warship
Hertha to the Mexican coast to calm the Gennan nationals.
A more ambitious plan, which would have sent two additional
ships, was cancelled in response to protests in the American
press against even this limited German naval activity.75
The Gennans had no intention of antagonizing the
United States, especially in isolation, and they made efforts to ensure that differences over Huerta would not spark
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an open confrontation.

Upon Hintze's return to his post in

September he was displeased to find that Kardorff's indiscretions had caused just such a possibility by uencouraging
the Mexican government to resist American policy."

Hintze

reported that John Lind had heard of Kardorff's actions, and
the American, believing that the charg; had been acting under orders, had insistently complained about them to the
British minister.

Disturbed, the German Foreign Office in-

structed Hintze to "Please avoid any further opposition to
the United States and counter any such interpretations of
our policy ... 7 6

At about the same time, Gerard was assured

in Berlin that "Germany has no political interest
co J and only desires law and order."77

(in Mexi-

The final proof of

Germany's willingness to acquiesce to American policy,
while not in agreement with it, came in November, when under pressure from Wilson, German diplomacy retreated from
the policy of openly supporting Huerta.7 8 This change in
Germany's position was illustrated when, at the end of
November, Hintze's French and Belgian colleagues proposed
that the European representatives in Mexico sponsor a joint
declaration similar to that of July.

This time Hintze de-

murred, on the grounds that "joint telegrams will arouse the
ire of the United States, giving the appearance of organized
opposition among the diplomatic corps here, and would interfere with friendly influence on Washington."79
German policy was also guided by the fear that the

BJ
United States would choose ultimately to intervene in Mexi-

co~O Germany would have little to gain in such an eventuality, and perhaps much to lose.

As Bernstorff wrote to Chan-

cellor Bethmann-Hollweg in November, "The current situation
from the standpoint of our economic interests, is certainly
not very favorable.

It is nonetheless preferable, in my

humble opinion, to the possibility of an American intervention.

Even if President Wilson were to remain firm and car-

ry out his program of treating Mexico exactly as Cuba was
treated, the Americans would still pick up all the pieces
in Mexico after the intervention." 81 Hintze therefore repeatedly attempted to convince his American colleagues that
the United States was not ready for a war, and urged
O'Shaughnessy to bring his government's attention to the potential dangers of its policy.

When O'Shaughnessy's wife

rather exhuberantly declared that the United States could
mobilize a million men in a matter of days, the German minister retorted, "Men, yes, but not soldiers." 82
These combined considerations caused Hintze, Carden,
and others to think in terms of a three-power intervention
in which the United States, Britain, and Germany would
jointly intervene to preserve the peace. 83 Walter Hines
Page, the American ambassador to Great Britain, proposed
action along these lines, but was overruled~4 Wilson had no
intention of allowing any European presence in North America, and he believed his own policy would eventually produce
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favorable results.

Colonel House wrote that Wilson was

determined that "all hands must be kept off excepting our

own." 85

And while Germany would not dare oppose the United

States alone, Britain's steadfast adherence to its November
understanding with Wilson killed Gennan hopes for a solely
. t erven t•ion. 86
European in
In March 1914, the Kaiser mused bitterly over this,
which he took as a betrayal of common interests: "England
has left Europe brilliantly in the lurch and brought itself into general discredit," he wrote.

"It should have

united with the continent in order to defend Europels interests jointly in Mexico, and thereby break the Monroe
Doctrine.

Wilson would have been forced to action and
would have come off with a bloodied hand in Mexico." 87
The realities of international politics argued against
any such cooperation, of course; Britain was not about to
take such a tremendous risk even for the sake of its sizeable interests in Mexico. 88

For Germany, however, such an

eventuality would have had several advantages, including,
probably, a rapprochement with Britain that would have
strengthened Germany's· position in.Europe considerably.
As Wilson's opposition to Huerta became increasingly
implacable, the United States began to resort to more intense measures to remove the dictator.

The successful dip-

lomatic sallies against Germany were followed shortly by
thoughts of military intervention or recognition of the
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Constitutionalists.

Partly because of Carranza's stubborn

refusal to allow American interference with Mexico's inter-

nal affairs, this recognition was not granted, but in February the arms embargo against the Constitutionalists was
lifted to help the rebels prepare for a major confrontation
with Huerta. 8 9 Secretary of State ~ryan explicitly spelled
out the aims of the administration's Mexican policy in a
dispatch to O'Shaughnessy:90
The purpose of the United States is solely and
singly to secure peace and order in Central America by seeing to it that the processes of selfgovernment there are not interrupted or set aside.
Usurpations like that of General Huerta menace
the peace and development of the United States as
nothing else could ... It is the purpose of the
United States therefore to discredit and defeat
such usurpations whenever they occur. The present policy of the United States is to isolate
Huerta entirely; to cut him off from domestic
credit, whether moral or material, and force him
out.
This strategy soon produced results, although not precisely
in accordance with Wilson's hopes.
By April of 1914, Huerta was on his last legs, in
spite of his determined and surprisingly successful attempts
to counter Wilson's vendetta.

The Constitutionalists,

spearheaded by Pancho Villa's massive army (the Division of
the North), had launched a powerful offensive in March, moving south along the central railways toward Mexico City.

At

Torreon, a strategic railhead, Villa's daring tactics won a
decisive and symbolically important victory, enabling his
troops to occupy the town on April 2.

At about the same
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time, other Constitutionalist forces converged on the Tampico area.

The rebels' advance, however, was delayed by a shortage of ammunition and by an intensifying rivalry between
Carranza and his most illustrious general, Pancho Villa.
Carranza thought Villa did not display the proper subordinanc e due to himself, as "First Chief," while Villa was increasingly annoyed by Carranza's arrogance and impressed
with his own growing power; at one point he declared he
would not fight for "pantywaists" like the First Chief .9l
Before this dispute was resolved (albeit only temporarily),
Woodrow Wilson decided to play a more active role in determining Mexico's destiny.

On April 21, 1914, American marines moved into the Mexican port city of Veracruz.9 2
The occupation of Veracruz climaxed an escalating
confrontation between Huerta and Wilson which had begun two

weeks earlier, when a group of American sailors was arrest-··
ed in Tampico by an overzealous Mexican officer.

The sail-

ors had been released, the offending Mexican arrested, and
an apology offered, but Huerta was unwilling to comply with
a subsequent American demand that the Mexicans deliver a
21-gun salute to the American flag, and President Wilson
was equally adamant that it be carried out.

This foolish

and petty wrangling had serious consequences, however, when
the State Department learned that the German steamer Ypiran~

was expected to land at Veracruz with a huge cargo of
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guns and ammunition for Huerta.93
At 2:JO AM on April 21, Secretary Bryan called President Wilson to inform him that the "Ypirango" (sic) would
arrive that morning at Veracruz with 15,000,000 rounds of
ammunition and 500 rapidfire guns.94

When Navy Secretary

Daniels advised "immediate action," Wilson ordered him to
"Take Veracruz at once!"

"It's too bad, isn't it," Wilson

later confided to his personal secretary, "but we could not
allow that cargo to land.
kind.

It is hard to take action of this

I have tried to keep out of this Mexican mess, but we

ar.e now on the brink of war and there is no alternative ... 95
It is clear, however, that Wilson's decision to stop
the Ypiranga was not based on his knowledge that the ship
was German; that particular consideration does not seem to
have been discussed or dwelt upon in any remarkable fashion.
And though some, such as Barbara Tuchman, have contended
that the arms shipment was part of a shady deal between
Hintze and Huerta,9 6 it is certain that the voyage of the
Ypiranga was not the product of any sinister German intentions or plot.

Thorough examinations of the incident have

shown that the ship carried mostly American-made arms purchased for Huerta with Mexican bonds by a consortium of American, French, and British entrepeneurs, and that the
Ypiranga was most probably chosen to transport the equipment
because it traveled on the most convenient schedule.97
Friedrich Katz speculates that the German line was deliber-
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ately chosen to create an embarassment for the German government, 98 but since he offers no evidence this assertion
must be considered to be purely conjectural.
Ironically, the occupation of Veracruz failed to fulfill its primary purpose, to prevent the landing of the
Ypiranga's

deadly cargo.

The ship was detained at Vera-

cruz for a week and a half, but after Bernstorff told the
State Department that the arms would be returned to Germany,
the ship was allowed to leave, whereupon it sailed indirectly to Puerto Mexico and unloaded there.
the arms were in Mexico City.99

Within a month

Knowledge of this caused

chagrin in Washington.

Bryan told Bernstorff he was "very
unpleasantly affected" by the news, 100 and years later Jesephus Daniels described his "sense of frustration and in-·
dignation" when he learned that the arms had made it
through: "It was to the Navy like a blow on the head," he
wrote.
The arms were delivered, however, not because of devious German motives, but because of sloppy diplomacy and a
series of misunderstandings between the United States, Germany, and the Hamburg-American Line ( Hapag) which owned
the ship.

Bernstorff's assurances had been in good faith,

and were based on a note to the German government from Hapag which stated that the cargo would "probably be shipped
back to Germany ... lOl

But although Hintze was opposed to

landing the arms because he believed the British would ex-
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plait such a development for propaganda purposes, he understood his instructions on the matter to mean that the incident was a "private affair," that is, to be resolved at Hapag's discretion. 102 Hintze's confusion is illustrated by
his belief that the Americans actually wanted the Ypiranga
to attempt a landing at Puerto Mexico to provide them with
a pretext to occupy that harbor too. 10 3 In any case, he
helped the captain of the ship to slip out of Veracruz and
participated in changing the delivery arrangements. 104 In
all, Bernstorff's explanation to Bryan seems to have accurately characterized the affair for the most part:

uex-

elusive responsibility for the delivery of the cargo," he
said,

11

belongs to the shipper's representatives in Veracruz,

who thought that in view of the changing circumstances that
the Americans had no objections to delivery."l05

It is al-

so evident, though, that the Foreign Office had not made
its objections absolutely clear to Hapag.
In all the confusion and misunderstanding, perhaps the
most revealing aspect of the incident is that it did not
have any lasting effect on German-American relations in
spite of the importance the United States had placed on
stopping the shipment.

American officials were disappoint-

ed, to be sure, and American public opinion was also temporarily inflamed. 106 Yet the United States had no wish to antagonize Germany over the matter, especially since Secretary
Bryan understood that international law was on the side of
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the Germans. 10 7

In May, customs fines levied against the

Ypiranga by American port authorities in Veracruz were cancelled

in a demonstration of good will, and the affair was

soon forgotten. 108
Huerta was encouraged by the shipment, but the arms
reached him too late to be of much use against the Constitutionalists .109

As the dictator vacillated between his de-

tennination to hold on and the realization that his time had
run out, he turned to Hintze for help, and at the end of May
offered Germany 150,000 square kilometers of land, including
oilfields, "which would be legally taken away from the Am.
" in
.
. t ance. 110
ericans,
re t urn f or assis

But Hintze had already begun to distance himself from
Huerta; during the Ypiranga affair he had been careful to
avoid the Mexican foreign minister, who had actually referred to him as Mexico's "ally." 111 Moreover, mounting
tensions in Europe made it absolutely impossible for Germany to take such a risk with a man whose political future
seemed non-existent.

Hintze explained Germany's position to
112
.
.
.
Huerta while reJecting the offers
The interests of Germany as well as of many
other European powers are in a happy and prosperous Mexico, for with such a Mexico the European trading and commercial interests would prosper as well. The representation of these· interests are nevertheless constrained by the present
political juncture •.• The reasons for this are the
antagonisms in Europe, the ceaseless European arms
race, the political dynamite in various parts of
Europe, all of which are material for an imminent

91
and explosive
nations would
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war in which the very existence of
be at stake. In such circumstances,
has reservations about overextending
the world. Should this occur, which-

ever country did it, it would be the signal for

another country to attack. Not out of hostility to
Mexico, but because it would want to exploit the
momentary weakness of its rival, and would be obliged to do so. As far as I can tell--and I am
speaking .•. as one old soldier to another--Huerta
has nothing to hope for from Europe, except discreet diplomatic help.
This exchange is highly significant, not only because
Hintze's remarks were a succinct summation of Germany's actual predicament, but also because it foreshadowed and
helps to explain the German-Mexican conspiracy of 1915 in
which Huerta played a prominent role. (See next chapter.)
From this conversation, and perhaps others like it, Huerta
might well have deduced that he could expect German help
in better circumstances, while Hintze undoubtedly under-

stood that Huerta would be willing to make sizeable concessions in return for German support.

Moreover, Hintze

frankly predicted Germany's later willingness to attack the
interests of its "overextended'' enemies (Great Britain and
the United States) in Mexico should a war make such action
a feasible and attractive option.

During the exchange de-

scribed above, of course, neither Hintze nor Huerta could
have anticipated the actual events that later occurred, nor
could they have known that such cooperation would ever come
to pass.
By the middle of 1914, domestic and foreign opposition
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had combined to render Huerta's position hopeless.

The

little optimism that remained was crushed on June 24, when
the revived Constitutionalist offensive took Zacatecas:
their next major target was Mexico City itself.

Realizing

his time had come, and hoping to spare the city and his supporters from the wrath of the vengeful Constitutionalists,
Huerta resigned on July 15, and was carried to exile on the
German steamship Dresden. 11 3 At the insistence of the German Foreign Office, which did not want to bear the full onus
of the ex-dictator's salvation, his family and staff boarded
a British ship. 114 Few people took seriously Huerta's promise to return ••when my country needs my sword. ,.ll5
Germany's Mexican policy during the first years of
the revolution can be characterized as reasonably successful
only because it was generally unambitious.

The first tenet

of its policy, avoidance of conflict with the United States,
was met, but this necessarily precluded other options in the
extremely delicate Mexican situation.

It is true that Ger-

man leaders, especially the Kaiser, would have liked to follow a much more active course, but Germany was never in a
position to do so.

Germany's relatively small economic in-

terests in Mexico, in and of themselves, would never have
justified the risks that a confrontation with the United
States would have entailed, and the Empire's position in
Europe was increasingly insecure.

Under no circumstances

would Germany have opposed the United States alone, because

93
Germany's stance in Mexico was generally calculated to address larger considerations than its

act~al,

tangible inter-

ests there.
For this reason German policy was remarkably flexible,
and the Germans were willing to reverse completely their
"pro-American" policy if the cooperation of Great Britain
could be obtained.

Joint Anglo-German action, even to the

point of military intervention, might have ensured that Germany's economic interests and nationals would receive additional protection from revolutionary dangers, but the opposite was just as likely if war with the United States
resulted.

Far more important to Germany were its strategic

interests; joint action on a significant scale could lead to
meaningful political realignments in Europe, perhaps even
the alliance with Britain that Wilhelm II so anxiously desired and needed to protect Germany's positon in Europe.
After Huerta's resignation and the assassination at
Sarajevo, when these considerations attained unprecedented
importance, the imaginative mind of the Kaiser apparently
saw a means to ameliorate Germany's difficulties with a
desperate but brilliant stroke.

In the middle of July 1914,

a representative of Wilhelm II (probably Albert Ballin, the
owner of Hapag) approached the British with a plan for an
. t ervent ion
.
. Mexico.
.
116 Details of
Ang1 o- German mi. 1- i• t ary in
in
the plan, if any, are not known, but it is clear that British acceptance of the overture might have dramatically
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changed the European political configuration.

Not surpris-

ingly, however, the British refused the offer, which, under

the circumstances, must have

struck them as incredibly ir-

relevant to the crisis that was threatening_ to engulf Europe
in a general war.
The outbreak of the First World War two weeks later
naturally brought new pressures to bear on German diplomatic policies, particularly with regard to the United States.
This intensified the conflicting components of German
policy, and, especially as it became clear that the war
would be a life-and-death struggle, the opportunistic
aspects of Germany's policies were unleashed and began to
take precedence.

The next chapter explores this transfor-

mation and the means Germany employed to exploit Mexico's
revolution for its own purposes.
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CHAPTER IV
RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT: GERMANY,
THE UNITED STATES, AND MEXICO·
1914-1917
We have seen that the Germans earlier had contemplated various ways to capitalize on Mexico's strategic location to advance Germany's world policy.

These schemes had

largely remained in the realm of speculation and fruitless
rumormongering until World War I began.

~he

war, however,

caused a detectable shift in Germany's policy toward the
United States.

Germany policy remained contradictory and

schizophrenic in nature, but German actions displayed an
increasing willingness to aggressively exploit tactical
opportunities to further the German war effort even at the
risk of damaging diplomatic relations with the United
States.

Germany's acts in Mexico during the First World

War were the results of the intensification of an old dilemma newly couched in demanding and inescapable terms.
On the one hand, Germany was anxious to maintain
friendly or at least correct relations with the United
States, since it certainly had no desire to acquire yet
another enemy.

Conversely, Germany naturally felt compelled

to slice the Allies' lines of supply, which largely originated in the United States.

As it became clear after the

lOJ
Battle of the Marne (September 12-16, 1914) that the war
would have no quick resolution, and as America's material

contributions to the Allies grew steadily, the need to cut
off the Allies' trade with America became ever more acute. 1
The inability of the Imperial Navy to establish a conventional blockade, however, forced the Germans to resort to
more unorthodox methods to stem the flow of munitions and
supplies.
Submarine warfare on the high seas was one expedient,
but it was not entirely effective for a variety of reasons,
most notably because the submarine weapon could not be utilized to its full potential without infringing on the maritime rights of the United States and other neutral countries.
Infractions of the international cruiser rules by German
submarines were a continuing source of serious friction between the United States and Germany, but until 1917 Germany
grudgingly restricted its submarine activity for fear of
overly antagonizing the United States.
Instead, covert, "deniable" expedients were employed
toward the same end.

Within the United States itself, Ger-

man agents undertook sabotage, propaganda campaigns, labor
agitation, and other methods to halt the manufacture and
shipment of war supplies for the Allies.

Moreover, in an

extension of the strategy of "Weltpolitik with the wars of
others," Germany made a number of attempts to embroil the
United States in a war with Mexico, knowing that such a
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development would divert America's energy, attention, and
resources to the more immediate threat to the south.
Under these circumstances, the increasingly chaotic
civil war in Mexico seemed to the Germans to be a "godsend,"
as the German ambassador, Johann von Bernstorff, put it. 2
Huerta's resignation in July of 1914 had put only a temporary end to the fighting.

The rivalry between Carranza and

Villa continued to simmer, with deepening distrust and antipathy developing in both camps.

Villa had expended the

last of his supplies in the battle for Zacatecas, but Carranza refused to send him coal and ammunition, even though
Villa's army was the most logical tactical choice to take
Mexico City.

Instead, Carranza stalled until his loyal
.,,,,

generals Alvaro Obregon and Pablo Gonzalez could enter the
capital first; Villa was not even invited to participate in
the triumphal march into the city on August 18.J

A final

break seemed imminent as Villa continued to amass arms and
supplies for his formidable army.

On October 1, Villa ex-

plicitly cut his ties with Carranza. 4
Meanwhile, Carranza had also alienated the Zapatistas
by concluding an agreement with Huerta's federal army whereby the federals would surrender their posts sou±h of the
capital to Constitutionalist forces, rather than to armies
under Zapata's control.

Zapata correctly interpreted this

move as a threat to his own position and suspected, again
correctly, that Carranza had no interest in the agrarian
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reforms that the men from Morelos had been fighting for
since 1911.5

The most pressing problem £or Mexico at this time was
the selection of a revolutionary leader

wh~

would be able

to unite the factions and establish a respected provisional
government to maintain order while the thorny political
questions that had arisen over the past four years could be
sorted out and a consensus established.

To address this

need a convention of the revolutionary forces was called to
meet at Aguascalientes, supposedly neutral ground, 6 where
it convened on October 10 in an atmosphere suffused with
suspicion, hope, fear and ambition.
Through his representatives, Villa let it be known
that he would "support any provisional president except
Carranza ... 7

Carranza, for his part, refused to acknowledge

the convention's authority, and when it "accepted" the first
Chief's "resignation" in advance, he declined to comply. 8
When the convention elected Eulalie Gutierrez Provisional
President, Carranza. would not recognize the act,9 and called
his supporters away from Aguascalientes.

By the end of No-

vember, all attempts at compromise had broken down, and the
revolution began a new phase, with the armies of the Conventionists (Villa and Zapata) opposed to the Constitutionalists under Carranza, while Mexico teetered close to complete anarchy.
At the beginning of 1915, the Conventionists seemed to
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hold a decided advantage.

Carranza's forces were confined

to the periphery of Mexico's eastern coast, holding Tam-

pico, Veracruz (which the Americans had only recently evacuated), and a few scattered towns in the northeast.

10

In-

stead of advancing on Carranza at Veracruz, however, Yilla
moved north, while Zapata's forees remained in Morelos.

The

Constitutionalists had been granted the breathing spell they
needed. 11
By the spring of 1915 the situation had changed dramatically.

Guxierrez, unable to control Villa or Zapata,

had fled Mexico City and resigned; a new Conventionist president, Roque Gonzalez Garza, as impotent as Gutierrez, had
taken his place.

More importantly, the Constitutionalist

forces, ably led by Alvaro Obregon, had taken sizeable
pieces of the territory once controlled by Villa.
The Conventionists were dealt a severe blow in April
in two mammoth battles at Celaya, where Villa sent wave
upon wave of fruitless assaults against Obregon's entrenched
defe,nses, losing thousands of men as well as priceless artillery, ammunition, and supplies, which Obregon swept up
with his cavalry in classic flanking movements.

Celaya did

not put an end to Villa's hopes, but Obregon had successfully
demonstrated his ability to thrust into Villa's territory
and decisively defeat the legendary caudillo with superior
tactics.

The battles were dramatic proof that Carranza

would be able to back up his claims to power with military
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might and marked the beginning of a new phase of the revolution in which the Constitutionalists were the predominant
power. 12
This was not so apparent to those in Washington, however.

Wilson's policy toward Mexico after Huerta's depar-

ture had been one of "watchful waiting," for the the most
part, in hopes that the renewed fighting would eventually
produce a constitutional government worthy of recognition.
Despite continual reports that Villa and his troops
had committed assorted atrocities, the general feeling in
Washington had favored the "Centaur of the North," who managed to impress American officials with his abilities, humanity, and good intentions. 1 3 Carranza, on the other hand,
was seen as weak, stubborn, and pretentiousi a "pedantic
ass," as Woodrow Wilson described him on one occasion. 14
To the disappointment of Wilson's administration, however,
the battles at Celaya proved that a solution to the Mexican
problem was still out of sight.

S~cretary

of State Bryan

told reporters on April 18 that the "failure of Villa ... has
about convinced administration officials here that the men
upon whom hopes had been pinned for the pacification of Mexico cannot be relied upon to save the situation ..... l5

This

was not unwelcome news to the Germans, who were already involved in a major effort to further confuse the situation.
On April lJ, Victoriano Huerta sailed into New York
City on the Spanish liner Antonio Lopez, greeted by a crowd
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of Mexicans who had gathered to meet him.

The "picturesque

old warrior," as one reporter described Huerta, looked
"just as alert mentally and physically as in the days when
he was supreme in Mexico City."

He was in the United

States, he said, for ''purposes of pleasure and travel" and
"a little personal business;• he had no intentions of visiting Mexico.

Two days later the ex-dictator held a news

conference at his hotel.

"The actual situation of my coun-

try," he said, "is too sad for me to analyze deeply.
archy is too soft a word for it."

An-

He denied, however, any

intentions to begin a "new Mexican revolution," calling such
stories ''unworthy of consideration."

He was considering a

trip to St. Louis. 1 7
Huerta's disclaimers did little to erase suspicions
aroused by his presence in the United States.

Even before

his boat had landed, the Constitutionalist representative
in the United States had asked the State Department for
Huerta's extradition, 18 and his actual arrival sparked additional protests from both the Conventionists and the Constitutionalists, asking for the ex-dictator's extradition or
detention. 1 9 The Wilson administration took no such action,
however, and merely put Huerta under a loose surveillance.
Huerta's arrival was not as innocent as he claimed,
but was in fact the initial step in implementing an elaborate plan to begin a new revolutionary effort with substan,
tial backing from the German government.

On February 15,
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Huerta had been visited by Captain Franz Rintelen von Kleist,
a staff officer attached to Abteilung IIIB, the intelligence
department

o! the German General Staff,

Although details of

their conversation are unknown, Rintelen offered Huerta German backing for another Mexican revolt, and Huerta did not
refuse. 20
About a month later, in March, Huerta received another
visitor.

This time it was Enrique Creel, the ex-governor of

Chihuahua, who outlined to Huerta a detailed plan for a revolt which Creel and other notable conservative Mexican emigres had been preparing for months.

The plan had widespread

support among the Mexican expatriates in Texas, from where
it would be launched: arms and ammunition had been purchased
and deposited all along the border.

The exiles were confi-

dent that if substantial financial backing and a strong
political leader could be found, the project had a good
chance of success.

Huerta agreed to lead the effort, and he

and Creel decided to enlist German financial support.
Huerta's subsequent journey to New York, a center of the expatriate population, was to allow him to gauge the extent of
actual support for such a movement, to complete necessary
planning and then, if possible, to carry it through. 21
Huerta set up his headquarters in the Manhatten Hotel,
and, under the eyes of a legion of spies, proceeded to meet
with hundreds of Mexican contacts. 22 Rumors spread that
General Felipe Angeles, Francisco Villa's artillery expert
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and right-hand man, was involved in the conversations. 2 3
It was also at this time that Huerta began serious negotia-

tiona with the Germans.
Rintelen, who had arrived in New York ten days before
Huerta, 24 was initially the principle German contact, but
he had other responsibilities too.

Convinced that supplies

from America had to be stopped at any cost, he organized
sabotage operations and supervised the manufacture of timerelease incendiary bombs that were planted by German agents
aboard ships bound for France and England. 25 He boasted of
having $50,000,000 to spend on his operations. 26 A friend
of the Crown Prince, Rintelen was urbane, audacious, and, as
one of his colleagues wrote, "obsessed with the personal ambition of pulling off some great coup for Germany." 27 He
was also careless.

Rintelen's crucial meeting with Huerta

was overheard by a Czech agent, who had arranged to procure an adjoining room and wire Huerta's for sound. 28
Rintelen started small, promising only American-made
arms, but Huerta insisted on more.

He wanted a semblance

of an alliance, heavy financial support, personal assurances
in case of failure, and U-boats to land arms on the Mexican
2
coast. 9 Rintelen felt compelled to wire Berlin for instructions.
There was friction among the German agents involved in
the case, however, and at this point Rintelen was replaced
in the negotiations by Franz von Papen, the German military
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attache accredited to the United States and Mexico, and
Carl Boy-Ed, the naval attache.

Both men were also heavi-

ly involved in sabotage operations, propaganda dissemination, and other schemes designed to promote Germany's cause
in the United States.

They secretly bought up vast quanti-

ties of munitions that otherwise would have been shipped to
the Allies, attempted to instigate strikes in Pittsburgh
steel mills, organized the sabotage of munitions plants,
and even attempted to recruit German-Americans for an army
to attack Canada.JO

Ambassador Bernstorff strenuously op-

posed these activities, believing they would lead to war
with the United States, but his objections were overruled
in Berlin.3 1
With the negotiations in the hands of Boy-Ed and
Papen, an agreement with Huerta was soon reached.

Huerta

was to receive a total of $895,000 to begin with, the bulk
of which was deposited in Huerta's account in Havana.
Eight million rounds of ammunition were already purchased
in St. Louis; J,000,000 more were on order in New York.

In

addition, 10,000 rifles would be granted immediately, along
with $10,000 cash in hand; more money and even U-boat support were possible in the future.

With the arrangements

essentially completed by the end of May, Papen traveled to
the Texas border to distribute funds in El Paso, Brownsville, and to make arrangements for smuggling German reservists into Mexico.3 2 In all, Germany appears to have com-
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mitted approximately $12,000,000 to Huerta's comeback
plans.JJ

Huerta spent the next three weeks consulting with
his advisors and making final plans for his new adventure.
His efforts were apparently proceeding well.

On June 1,

Huerta told Felipe Angeles' son that he had amassed a total
of $10,000,000, with twice that much "in reserve," and that
envoys had been sent to recruit disenchanted Villistas and
Carrancistas. 34
Huerta was also given additional information at this
time concerning the Mexican Peace Assembly, the political
organization which had recruited him to head the movement.
A confabulation of seasoned Huertistas, Porfiristas, and
other Mexicans tired of the chaos of the revolution, the
Peace Assembly had concluded that appeals to the warring
factions were useless, and that only a massive military
force could bring an end to the civil war.

Although the

organization contained reformist elements, it seems to have
been actually quite reactionary.JS

When Huerta was satis-

fied that he had sufficient political and financial support,
he decided to act.
On June 25, Huerta boarded a train west, telling reporters that he was planning to attend the international
exposition in San Francisco.3 6

Late the next evening, how-

ever, an Associated Press correspondent notified the government that Huerta had changed trains in St. Louis, and was
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headed for El Paso.37

Huerta actually left the train at

Newman, a few miles north, where Pascual Orozco, Jr., who

was to have been the military commander of the revolt, was
waiting for him in an auto ready to leave for the border.3

8

Unfortunately for Huerta, agents of the Department of Justice, with police and soldiers to back them up, were also
waiting for him.

Huerta and Orozco were arrested on

charges of conspiracy to violate United States neutrality
laws and taken under guard to El Paso.39
The arrest of Huerta and Orozco spelled the end of the
movement.

Orozco escaped his captors in early July, only to
be gunned down by a Texas posse August 30. 40 Huerta was
shuttled between the local jail, Fort Bliss, and house arrest, always under surveillance.

At one point he sent a

protesting telegram to Count Bernstorff, but the German ambassador merely turned it over to the State Department.
''This is truly extraordinary," commented Woodrow Wilson. 41
The revolutionary movement had broken up, and Germany was
apparently no longer interested in Huerta. 42 The aging alcoholic, still technically under arrest, died in January
1916 of a liver ailment.
The Huerta conspiracy demonstrated Germany's wartime
eagerness to divert the United States from the European conflict in spite of the obvious risks involved.

It is clear

that the operation, even if it were only marginally successful, would have hopelessly complicated the Mexican domestic
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situation.

Papen and Boy-Ed do not seem to have extracted

explicit promises from Huerta to actually begin a war with

the United States; and even if the wily caudillo did make
such a commitment, Huerta was sufficiently astute to understand what such a war might mean for Mexico and himself.
Most likely, Germany counted on Wilson's active dislike for
Huerta to provoke a thoroughgoing American intervention.
More puzzling is the United States government's curious inaction during this episode.

True, Huerta was appre-

hended before he could cause any real damage, but it is surprising that he was allowed to get as close to Mexico as he
did.

The government, according to Emil Voska, the Czech

agent mentioned above, had been kept completely informed
of Huerta's activities and Germany's involvement; yet Secretary Bryan doubted the truth of these reports, 4 3 and American surveillance of Huerta was apparently so loose that
the crucial information that Huerta had switched trains in
St. Louis c-ame from a newspaperman.

Was this luck?

Moreover, the government's decision not to publicize
its knowledge of Germany's involvement at this time is also
revealing.

Perhaps it can be best understood in light of

President Wilson's personal reluctance to plunge the United
States into the European war.

Because of the sinking of the

Lusitania, relations between the United States and Germany
were particularly tense at this time, and it is possible
that Wilson did not wish to further inflame public opinion,
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especially on the basis of legally questionable evidence
supplied by a foreign spy.

It is notable that Huerta was

never close to being brought to trial, although he was in
custody for more than six months on the

con~piracy

charges

brought against him before he died.
Even as Huerta sat in his cell, however, American officials were becoming concerned about the possibility of
German involvement in another Mexican movement which revolved around the "Plan of San Diego,'' one of the more intriguing documents produced during the Mexican revolution.
In January 1915, a group of Mexican prisoners in a Carrancista prison in Monterrey signed a document outlining the
"Plan of San Diego, Texas," which had been written by "a
friend" of one of the signers.

This extraordinary manifesto

called for a revolt against the United States government,
with the object of winning the "independencen of Texas, New
Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, and California, states which had
been

·~robbed"

from Mexico by

"Nort~

American imperialism."

All Anglo males over the age of 16 would be killed, along
with all "traitors" who would not subscribe to the cause.
An important clause endeavored to incite the support of
southern blacks, who would be rewarded with "aid in obtaining six States of the American Union" so that "they may
therefore be independent. •• 44 A certain Agustin S. Garza was
appointed to become commander of the "Liberating Army for
Races and Peoples," and the invasion scheduled for February
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20, 1915.45
The Plan seemed so absurd that when Basilio Ramos, one

of the signers of the Plan, was brought to trial in May for
attempting to "steal" parts of the United States, he was released by the judge, who told him "You should be tried f'or
lunacy--not conspiracy against the United States."

46

The scheme was underfunded and often the object of
ridicule even in Mexico, but the Plan did have a serious effeet on Mexican-American relations.

No uprising occurred on

February 20; instead, the movement was reorganized, and the
originators were apparently replaced by a new set of men. 4 7
The hoped-for mass uprising was evidently impossible to engineer.

A black doctor, Jesse Mosely, was sent into Texas

to rouse the black population there, but his ef'forts produced no results, and Mosely himself was later found dead
with his skull crushed. 48 Military activities under the
red and white banner of the Plan of San Diego instead took
the form of a long series of hit-and-run raids across the
Texas-Mexican border, in which the rather motley "invaders"
burned bridges, tore up train tracks, and killed a number of
American citizens, including United States soldiers, causing a great deal of unrest among the Texas border population. 49

In spite of determined eff'orts by the United States

Army to stop or apprehend the "San Diego" marauders, who
typically operated in bands of 50 to 250 men, the raids
intensif'ied during August and September of 1915, and then
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abruptly ended in October, with a brief resurgence of activity in May and June the following yaar.5
Despite a number 0£ diligant a.nd

per~eptiva studies,5 1

the movement surrounding the Plan of San Diego remains
clouded in mystery and conjecture, especially with regard
to the role played by Germany in the organization's activities.

It is clear that several .American officials at the

time suspected German involvement.

Vice Consul Randolph

Robertson in Monterrey, for example, reported that the German consul there had supplied financial support to the organization and had offered to pay salaries for its adherents.

A secret agent sent by the Department of Justice to

investigate the matter was told by the Spanish and Italian
consuls in Monterrey that the allegations were true.5 2
Other, less reliable indications of German involvement have also surfaced.

It was reported, for example, that

a German-backed Mexican newspaper gave full coverage to the
Plan; that raiders killed a number of Americans only after
asking whether they were German; and that a Mexican used a
German flag to protect his house from the border violence,
saying that he had been instructed to do so by unknown
men.53

Two of the (probably fictitious) names signed to the

February 20 reorganization document, J.Z. Walcker and J.R.
Becker, seem suspiciously Germanic, and commissions given to
officers of the movement were reportedly signed by a German. 54
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While evidence of this sort is intriguing, however,
it is certainly not compelling.

Similarly, M.C. Meyer's

argument that the Plan was conceived as a "diversionary
movement" linked to the Huerta conspiracy5~

is plausible

in some respects, but it does not explain the continued
activities of the raiders long after Huerta had disappeared
from the scene.

Moreover, this explanation fails to take

into account the insistent reports and indications that the
movement was receiving money and other aid from Carranza's
government.5 6 Extensive research in German archives has
failed to produce any references to German involvement in
the Plan of San Diego, nor did any German messages intercepted by the British during this time reveal any such
activity.57
While no solid proof has been found to positively link
the Germans with the Plan, the possibility that such a connection did exist cannot be ruled out either.

The absence

of evidence in German archives, for example, does not necessarily mean that no such activities took place; other plots
of this nature are not recorded in the archives either.5 8
Moreover, it has been shown that German agents were engaged
in activities that were parallel or similar to those pursued by adherents of the Plan of San Diego.
For example, Heinrich von Eckhardt, the German
ter in

M~xico,

minis~

and Heinrich Albert, the German commercial

attache in Washington, were both involved in an effort to
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sow discontent among American blacks.

They cooperated in

disseminating propaganda in the southern United States and

Mexico, promising that if blacks would revolt they would be
granted an independent republic.59

The campaign was

directed in Mexico City by Eckhardt, who used Mexicans
to spread the propaganda in Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas,
. . . . Al a bama, an d Georgia.
. 60
M1ss1ss1pp1,
In late 1914, Horst von der Goltz, a German who
served as an officer in the Constitutionalist army, was
named the head of the German secret service in Mexico. By
Goltz's own account, he was given the authority to spend
"almost unlimited sums of money for the purchase of arms,
for the bribery of officials--for anything in fact that
would cause trouble in Mexico ... 61 If the Germans were not
directly involved in the Plan of San Diego, there can be
little question that they would have been interested in
just such an operation. 62 Thus, while the proof is inconclusive, final judgment on this matter should be suspended
until more information is available.
The fortunes of the Conventionists continued. their
dramatic decline in the summer and fall of 1915.

Villa's

twin defeats at Celaya were followed by another stinging
loss at Leon in early June; the territory he controlled was
shrinking rapidly.

On June 2, President Wilson called on

the factions to reconciie their differences peacefully,
with an implicit threat that the United States would other-
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wise intervene militarily and impose a settlement.

Villa,

stunned by his recent setbacks, was willing to comply, but

Carranza refused to acknowledge that the United States had
any right to interfere in Mexican affairs, and snubbed the
offer.

The Constitutionalists had no intention of comprom-

ising with Villa when a military victory was in sight.
Obregon bluntly rejected Wilson's appeal, saying, "No sensible Mexican fails to understand that Villa is defeated as
a general and is a nullity as a politician." 6 J On July 10,
at Aguascalientes, Villa suffered yet another loss, and was
forced to retire north to his home state of Chihuahua.
Although Wilson personally disliked Carranza ("I have
never known a man more impossible to deal with on human
principles," the President commented in July), 64 it was becoming increasingly clear that the United States would have
to deal with the "First Chief," whose dominant military
position could not be ignored.

Thus the administration

began to contemplate recognizing the Constitutionalist government.
Despite Wilson's threat to intervene, the events of
June and July convinced administration officials that military action in Mexico would be inadvisable.

Although the

growing strength of Carranza contributed to this decision,
there were other important considerations.

Relations with

Germany were so precarious in the summer of 1915 that a
break or even war could come any day, and the administration
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had no wish to be tied down in Mexico at this crucial
time. 65 Moreover, knowledge of German involvement in the
Huerta conspiracy and reports of other German activities
in Mexico worked to establish the strong conviction that
by becoming militarily involved in Mexico, America would
only be fulfilling Germany's wishes.
Robert Lansing, the new Secretary of State, had replaced Bryan on June 18, but first learned of Rintelen's
avtivities on July 4. 66

Unlike Bryan, Lansing was moved to

action by the information.

On July 11, in a memorandum en-

titled "Consideration and Outline of Policies," Lansing
sketched out his impressions of the situation in Mexico: 67
I have come to the conclusion that the German Government is utterly hostile to all nations with
democratic institutions because those who compose
it see in democracy a menace to absolutism and
the defeat of the German ambition for world domination •••. German agents have undoubtably been
at work in Mexico arousing anti-American feelings,
and holding out false hopes of support. The proof
is not conclusive but it is sufficient to compel
belief.
The memo proposed secret investigations of German
activities in La.tin America, "particularly Mexico," and
the adoption of means to frustrate them.

Under the cir-

cumstances, keeping friendly relations with Mexico was
essential.

"To do this," Lansing wrote, "it will be neces-

sary to recognize Carranza's faction, which seems to be
the stronger." 68

Although Wilson's views of German ac-

tivities in Mexico at this time are not explicitly known,
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it is likely that he agreed with his Secretary of State,
for on August 4, Wilson stated that he was convinced that
the United States was "honeycombed with German intrigue

6

and infested with German spies." 9
In any case, the subsequent policy of the United
States conformed with Lansing's blueprint for action.

In

August, the administration opened a conference, attended by
representatives of the United States, Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Uruguay, and Guatemala, to decide on a solution to
the Mexican situation.

Despite Carranza's unpopularity,

the Constitutionalist's military strength seemed to dictate the only probable answer, and on October 9, 1915, the
conferees recommended that Carranza's government be accorded de facto recognition by their governments.70
In his diary Lansing recorded his thoughts the next
day, October 10:7 1
Looking at the general situation I have come to
the following conclusions:
Germany desires to keep up the turmoil in Mexico until the United States is-forced to intervene; therefore, we must not intervene.
Germany does not wish to have any one faction
dominant in Mexico; therefore, we must recognize
one faction as dominant in Mexieo.
When we recognize a faction as the government,
Germany will undoubtably seek to cause a quarrel
between that government and ours; therefore, we
must avoid a quarrel regardless of criticism and
complaint in Congress and the press.
It comes down to this: Our possible relations
with Germany must be our first consideration;
and all our intercourse with Mexico must be
regulated accordingly.
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Lansing's views are important because, with President Wilson increasingly distracted by Europeanponcerns, the Sec-

ratary of Stata had assumed greater control over Mexican
policy than had been true in Bryan's time.7 2
On October 19, the United States recognized Carranza's
Constitutionalists as the de facto government of Mexico,
and shortly afterward clamped an arms embargo on the Villistas.

While these actions were in a sense only the lat-

est of the administration's long series of tactics intended
to stabilize Mexico, Lansing's thoughts, so concisely revealed above, show that the Secretary of State clearly
recognized that the world war had given a new dimension to
the continuing crisis in Mexico.

More than ever, the in-

terests of the United States lay in bringing peace to that
troubled country.

After recognizing Carranza, the United

States was determined to help him consolidate his power,
as subsequent events demonstrated.
By October Villa's status had declined considerably,
but he still led a respectable army.

His next move, as

widely anticipated, was to march on Agua Prieta, a border
town opposite Douglas, Arizona.

The capture of isolated

Agua Prieta would have given Villa a second "port" through
which he could obtain supplies from the United States, and
would have seriously reduced Carranza's strength in northern Sonora.73
To counteract this threat, President Wilson gave
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Carranza unprecedented permission to transport Mexican
troops and supplies across United States territory.

As a

result, when Villa arrived at Agua Prieta in late October,
he encountered not the relatively small garrison he had expected but a large, well-entrenched force protected by
barbed wire and strategically placed machine guns.74
The ensuing battle was disastrous for Villa, who
would not or could not adapt his tactics to meet this new
style of warfare.

Enraged by the news that the United

States had recognized Carranza, Villa threw his forces at
Agua Prieta in a desperate, bloody, but futile assault.
Repulsed, he turned his army south to Hermosillo, where,
in a replay of the last battle, his army was utterly destroyed.

Villa retreated north with the remnants of his

once-powerful command, defeated and embittered.75

In one

year Villa had been reduced from the most powerful general
in Mexico to the leader of a small and undisciplined band
of outlaws.
Germany meanwhile had been busy organizing an extensive network of agents and spies in Mexico to spread propaganda, smuggle arms, plan sabotage, and conduct other
activities calculated to exacerbate tensions between the
United States and Mexico.

Several years before the war,

German nationals in Mexico had organized the Verband
Deutscher Reichsangehoriger (Union of Subjects of the
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Gennan Empire.)

When the world war began, the Verband,

like some organizations of its kind in the United States,
became involved in propaganda, fund raising, and espionage.
It also grew rapidly.

By October 1915, the Verband's

membership had quadrupled since the beginning of the war
to 522 members distributed among approximately thirty
groups throughout Mexico.7 6

German diplomatic and consular

officials were active in recruiting agents to promote Germany's aims, sometimes with astonishing success.

Felix

Sommerfeld, for example, ·a German who was Carranza' s chief
intelligence officer and later Villa's most trusted agent
along the border,77 was enlisted as a Gennan spy, as was
Villa's personal physician and adviser, Lyman Rauschbaum.7 8
Horst von der Goltz, a Carrancista officer, was similarly
recruited by the German consul in Monterrey.

He cooperated

with Papen in an abortive plot to blow up Canada's Welland
Canal, and was to be the head of the Gennar1 secret service
in Mexico until he was arrested by the British en route to
Germany.79

It is impossible to judge the full extent of

Germany's espionage and propaganda network in Mexico, but
it was extensive.

Possibly it made use of some fifty Ger-

mans with commissions in the Constitutionalist army, one
of whom, General Maximilian Kloss, was a confidant of the
First Chief and his most able artillery officer. 80
An indication of the nature and scope of other German covert activities in Mexico can be found in a report
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sent by Eckhardt to Chancellor Theobald von BethmannHolweg on July JO, 1915: 81
First, the naval attache (Boy-Ed] suggested to me
thro~h the intermediary of the Kaiser's ambassador LBernstorff] that we have the oil wells in
Tampico destroyed. He further proposed that we
help return to Germany men liable for military
service who could not get to Europe from New
York, and who had returned to Mexico. The Kaiser's ambassador and the military attache [Papen]
told me expressly that the creation of travel
possibilities for the reserve officers and aspiring officers currently in the United States
would be very worthwhile. To achieve both ends,
Herr Rau, at my behest, negotiated with intermediaries with whom I, for obvious reasons, could
not have personal contact, following thorough
discussions with the naval and military attaches.
The planned sabotage in the Tampico oil fields was
never carried out, perhaps because the German Admiralty
believed the action would not be worthwhile; it wired BoyEd on March 11, 1916 that "significant military damage to
England through closing of Mexican oil resources not possible .1182

Papen disagreed, and a week later reported that 83

In view of the. great importance of Tampico (Mexico)
oil wells for the English fleet ..• ! have sent Herr
V. Petersdorf there in order to create the greatest possible damage through extensive sabotage of
tanks and pipelines. Given the current situation
in Mexico, I am expecting large successes from
relatively small resources.
It is possible that the Admirality's opinion on the matter
prevailed, or perhaps Petersdorf failed in his mission,
but the sabotage was never accomplished. 84 In any case, it
seems that other methods used to achieve the same purpose
already had met with failure.

On March 6, a week before
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Boy-Ed received the Admiralty's telegram, four Germans were
deported from Mexico at Carranza's orders for their alleged

8

attempts to foment labor unrest in Tampico. 5
Carranza hardly could have been pleased with attempts
to deprive his government of a prime source of revenue, and
in spite of claims that he was already in Germany's pocket, 86 the First Chief does not seem to have been welldisposed toward Germany at this time.

He was aware of

Germany's participation in the Huerta conspiracy and was
loath to treat with the nation which had carried "the Usurper" to safety in July 1914. 87

Events would soon transpire

to alter his orientation, however.
The attention of the world public, which might have
been sated by the increasingly grisly fighting in Europe,
was periodically turned to Mexico, to which the war had
given a strange new importance.

In April 1915, as the

Huerta conspiracy was unfolding, the Frankfurter Zeitung
had expressed its rather remarkable_concern for a nation
so remote from the trenches of France1 88
Conditions in Mexico defy description ... It is
difficult to stµ>press the feelin$ of bitterness
against those l_the United StateSj who fomented
where they could have extinguisned smouldering
fire ..•• We must not lose sight of Mexico, even
in the storms of the present war, because Mexico will become the focus of a gigantic movement
of world power.
In August a newspaper expose'by the Providence
Journal concerning the Huerta conspiracy similarly
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awakened Americans to the danger from the south. 89

As the

public disclosures continued, and as reports of German activities in Mexico and the United States multiplied, the
Wilson administration took some action.

In December the

German government was requested to recall Papen and Boy-Ed;
and later that month in his annual message to Congress,
Woodrow Wilson lashed out against subversives ("creatures
of passion, disloyalty, and anarchy") who had cooperated in
"foreign intrigues," thereby creating the "gravest threats
against our national peace and safety ... within our own borders."
lem. 90

He asked Congress for laws to deal with the prob-·
The President also pledged his friendship for Mex-

ico, saying the states of America were "cooperating
friends .•. spiritual partners .•. Separated they are subject
to all the cross currents of the confused politics of a
world of hostile rivalries; united in spirit and purpose
they cannot be disappointed of their peaceful destiny."9l
Once again, however, events in Mexico proved to be
beyond Wilson's effective control, for in spite of the
President's every intention to refrain from military action
while awaiting "the rebirth of the troubled Republic, 9 2
11

the United States was soon on the brink of a war with its
southern neighbor.
In the early morning hours of March 9, 1916, the
little border town of Columbus, New Mexico was attacked by
Pancho Villa and an armed force numbering some 485 men.
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For about an hour the Mexicans, shouting "Viva Villa!"
looted, burned, and killed until they

w~re

finally compel-

led to retire by the U.S. Army detachment stationed
there.93

While the cavalry chased the raiders over the

border in hot pursuit, it was discovered that the attackers
had killed seventeen Americans (eight soldiers, nine civilians), wounded eight others, and had taken an undeterminable amount of cash from the local bank along with a number of horses, rifles, and some other supplies.9 4

The

Villistas paid a heavy price for these meager spoils, however, losing 67 men in the attack and about a hundred to
the pursuing cavalry.95
What was the purpose of this attack?

This question

has been a favorite and controversial topic ever since the
day of the raid itself, and the subject of many books,
articles, and monographs arguing for almost every conceivable interpretation, including the absurd contention that
Woodrow Wilson himself hired Villa to do the evil deed.9 6
The most standard interpretation has been that Villa attacked the town in an illogical gesture of revenge for
what he believed to be a betrayal by the United States,97
but evidence has appeared

that indicates, but does not

prove, the hand of Germany at work.
The idea of German influence behind the raid is not
new.9

8

Dr. R.H. Ellis, Villa's medical chief of staff,

even argued in an interview years later that the entire

lJO
attack was staged by a German agent, one Luther Wertz, who
arranged for a Villa look-alike to head the Mexicans.99
This contention seems to be amply refuted by the evidence, 100 but a mu~h more subtle and intriguing theory
has been presented, in various forms, by Friedrich Katz,
101
James A. Sandos, and Michael C. Meyer.
In May 1915, the head of German propaganda operations
in the United States, Bernhard Dernburg, reported to Berlin
an intriguing conversation he had with Felix Sommerfeld,
Villa's chief agent in the United States.

After noting

that it would be difficult to pull the United States into
102
an intervention in Mexico, Dernburg continued:
Roughly two months ago, there was an incident on
the Arizona border, which almost provoked an intervention. At that time, the chief of the American general staff was sent to the border by President Wilson ... to negotiate with Villa. These negotiations took place with the mediation of Felix
A. Sommerfeld, and at that moment, as he repeatedly told me, it would have been easy for him to
provoke an intervention .... This opportunity appears to be presenting itself again in the immed~
iate future, and Felix A. Sommerfeld has discussed it with me. He is quite convinced that an intervention in Mexico by the United States can be
brought about ..•. Aside from Mr. Sommerfeld, who is
the source of this idea, I am the only one who
knows his plans. We have both declined to discuss
this affair with the German ambassador here, since
we are convinced that the less that is known, the
better, and moreover, that this delicate affair
can only be decided directly at the appropriate
level. After this report has been considered, I
request that Felix A. Sommerfeld be given a "yes"
or a "no" in whatever way, through me directly.
This report was given to Secretary of State Jagow in the
German Foreign Office, whose response was unqualified:lOJ

lJl

In my opinion, thP- answer is absolutely 'yes.'
Even if the shipments ·Of munitions cannot be·
stopped, and I am not sure they can, it would be
highly desireable for America to become involved in
in a war and be diverted from Europe, where it is
clearly more sympathetic to England •.• an intervention made necessary by the developments in Mexico
would be the only possible diversion_ for the American government.
It is tempting to link Sommerfeld's conversation with
Dernburg to the raid at Columbus less that a year later,
especially since other evidence clearly demonstrates that
Sommerfeld's connection with the Germans was hardly casual
or sporadic.

This evidence indicates, for example, that

Villa, through Sommerfeld and Villa's brother Hipolito, received guns, ammunition, and large sums of money under German auspices in the latter part of 1915. 104 Moreover,
Villa's personal physician, Lyman B. Rauschbaum, who had a
good deal on influence with Villa, is also known to have
been a German operative. 10 5
It is not contended that Villa was actually bought by
the Germans, or that he consciously attacked Columbus to
promote Germany's interests.

Instead, Katz and Sandos sug-

gest that Sommerfeld engineered a subtle "double p_lay" -Sommerfeld to Rauschbaum to Villa--in which Rauschbaum
tricked Villa into believing that in attacking Columbus he
could even the score with a Jewish merchant, Sam Ravel, by
whom Villa believed he had been cheated. 106 The interpretation is to some extent supported by the recollections of
a former Villista major, Jose Orozco, who served on Villa's
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personal bodyguard the day before the raid on Columbus.

10

7

This is an intriguing theory, which has the additional advantage of clearing up some nagging mysteries surrounding the raid. 108 Yet, as Meyer points out,_ no "smoking
gun," no document that would unambiguously establish the
theorized relationship of events, has been found.l09

In

fact, some documentary evidence exists which indicates that
key officials in the German Foreign Office in Berlin knew
nothing of any such plot. 110 Ambassador Bernstorff, ironically enough, wrote Berlin in March that while ucertain
anti-German papers state that we have paid Villa [to attack
Columbus) there would be just as much justification for
saying that the President [Wilson] had bribed him.

Wilson's

opportunity for being reelected has at one stroke been very
materially improved." 111 Bernstorff's ignorance of any
such operation, of course, is not proof that one did not
exist.

George S. Viereck, a prominent German propagandist

who knew the ambassador well, once ~oted that Bernstorff
~abhorred illicit activities.• 112 If a plot with Sommerfeld did exist, it is entirely possible that the planners,
anticipating Bernstorff's objections, simply decided to
leave him uninformed.

Dernburg followed this course in re-

porting his conversation with Sommerfeld djrectly to Berlin.
In this connection it might be noted that the Germans were
careful to base their covert operations in New York, partly

lJJ
so that Bernstorff could disassociate himself from them in
case of discovery.

If the case for German involvement in

the Columbus attack has not been proved, it must still remain a possibility.

It is also true, however, that other

plausible explanations can be found for Villa's action at
Columbus.

In any case, it is significant that Germany did

surreptitiously support Villa in his waning efforts and
fully intended to make use of this secret connection to
disrupt relations between the United States and Mexico.
On March 28, 1916, Bernstorff again reported that Germany
was being blamed for the Columbus raid, and concluded that
•Naturally, no proof of such a false assertion was
duced."

pro~

Next to the words "false assertion" on this re-

port, an official in Berlin added his comment:

''Unfortun-

ately." llJ
If Villa had intended, for whatever reasons, to provoke an American intervention, he was emminently successful.
The Columbus raid, coming on the heels of other atrocities
committed by Villistas against Americans, immediately
brought public opinion in the United States to a unanimous
boiling point. 114 Independent magazine in New York, for example, departed from its usually deliberative pose and demanded action: 115
The murderer Villa and his fellow bandits· must be
punished .... The United States must perform the task
itself. The armed forces must seek out the murderers of Columbus and put them to death .•.. We are not
waging war; we are administering justice. We shall

1J4
not assail the rights of any other people; we
shall merely defend our own. To do less would be
national dishonor.

On March 10, the President took what might have been
a fateful step and ordered an expedition to enter Mexico
"with the sole object of capturing Villa and preventing
further raids by his band, with scrupulous regard to ~h~
sovereignty of Mexico." 116 Within a week six thousand American troops poured into Mexico to chase down the
Villistas, who by then had scattered into the vast Chihuahuan desert.
It soon became clear that the presence of thousands
of American troops penetrating hundreds of miles into Mexican territory was fundamentally incompatible with the administration's desire to pay '·'scrupulous regard" to Mexican
sovereignty, especially since Carranza had declined to give
his permission for the incursion.

While expressing his

willingness to negotiate a treaty which would give the
United States a limited right to chase raiders in hot pursuit in the future~ 1 7 Carranza repeatedly.informed the State
Department that the Punitive Expedition was unwelcome in
Mexico.

But Wilson and Lansing either misunderstood or ig-

nored Carranza's protests.

As the American forces probed

ever deeper into Mexico with little success, Carranza began to deploy his troops in ominously threatening posi118
.
.
t ions,
and a confrontation loomed ahead.
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On April 12, a column of U.S. cavalry peacefully entered the town of Parral in southern Chihuahua, 180 miles
south of the border.

A gathering crowd of Mexicans around

the troopers became hostile, at least partly due to the efforts of "a small, compactly built man with a Van Dyke
beard" shouting ..Todos! Ahora! Viva Mexico!" and who, according to Major Frank Tompkins, the troop's commander,
''looked like a German." ll9

Tompkins' impression was con-

firmed days later by the town's mayor, who told Colonel
W.C. Brown that the German consul, Edward Cook, was reported
to have been instrumental in inciting the crowd. 120
The troopers were able to retire from the village in
good order, but they were pursued by the crowd and a number
of Mexican soldiers.

Shots were exchanged, and two American
soldiers were killed, as well as forty Mexicans. 121
After this incident the friction between Carranza's
government and the United States began to assume crisis proportions.

The situation was aggravated by the recurrence of

a number of border raids conducted by Luis de la Rosa, a
leader of the ~Plan of San Diego" bands1 22 and whom Carranza
was reported to be supporting. 12 3 Wilson refused to withdraw the Punitive Expedition until peace was established along the border, 124 while Carranza became increasingly adamant that the troops leave immediately.
A war seemed imminent.

On May 1, Generals Scott and

1J6
Funston wired the Secretary of War that 125
Every source of information leads us to believe
that Mexican generals are certain of our entire
lack of preparedness, feeling that they can cope
successfully with the United States and propose to
attempt it unless we retire at once. F:ully expect
attack if US does not agree to full withdrawal.
To meet this threat the United States mobilized the National Guard and took steps to assemble over 100,000 troops along the Mexican border. 126 Nevertheless, American military weakness was painfully apparent to American offi-·
cials. 12 7 Even after the American Chief of Staff, General
Hugh Scott, met with Obregon at El Paso and agreed to an
eventual withdrawal of the American troops 128 the crisis
threatened to spiral out of control.
The diplomatic exchanges between the two nations grew
increasingly sharp, even sarcastic.

On June 20 Lansing re-

plied to a threatening Mexican note (which special representative Rodgers had described as "inexact, improper, and impudent") with the observation that a government that could
not protect life and property within its borders was a government "not worthy of the name.# 12 9 Lansing refused to
acquiesce to Carranza's demand for immediate withdrawal.
The next day a serious firefight occurred between
American and Mexican forces at Carrizal.

Seventy-five Mex-

icans were killed and the Americans lost twelve killed and
twenty-three taken prisoner.

To many in Mexico City, it

seemed the anticipated war had begun. 1 3°

1J7
In the United States, too, it was widely believed
even in official circles that a war with Mexico was "inevitable.u131

Theodore Roosevelt characteristically began or-

ganizing his own division for the anticipated fight; newspaper advertisements appeared with slogans like "Every boy
going to Mexico should be provided with a package of Bellam for indigestion." 132 President Wilson demanded the return of the prisoners, formally incorporated the National
Guard into the regular army, and took other measures to
prepare the nation for war.lJJ

But he was extremely re-

luctant to see the United States dragged into a general
conflict in Mexico at a time when tensions with Germany
stemming from the submarine issue were becoming especially
acute.

As Wilson told his personal secretary, Joseph Tu-

multy:1J4
Tumulty, some day the people of America will
know why I hesitated to intervene in Mexico. I
cannot tell them now for we are at peace with the
great power whose poisonous propaganda is responsible for the terrible condition of affairs in
Mexico. German propagandists are there now, fomenting strife and trouble between our countries.
Germany is anxious to have us at war with Mexico,
so that our minds and our energies will be taken
off the great war across the sea. She wishes an
uninterrupted opportunity to carry on her submarine warfare and believes that war with Mexico
will keep our hands off her and thus give her
liberty of action to do as she pleases on the high
seas. It begins to look as if war with Germany is
inevitable. If it should come--! pray God it may
not--! do not wish America's energies and forces
divided, for we will need every ounce of strength
we have to lick Germany.
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Wilson's fear of becoming enmeshed in an untimely war
with Mexico may have been accentuated by reports in late

June that Gennany was negotiating with Mexico for an alliance which would make the resumption of unrestricted warfare possible. 135

These rumors do not seem to have been

rooted in fact 136 (Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg called them
"ridiculous and unfounded"),l37 but there can be no question but that Germany looked upon the Mexican-American
crisis with satisfaction.
ialized in July: 13 8

The Xaegliche Runds-chau editor-

We consider it not worth the trouble to deny the
charge in the allied press that Germany is egging
Mexico into war in order to prevent the exportation
of ammunition to the allies. That the profitable
export of shells to France and England will suffer
through the l0xpectedJ war with Mexico is, to be
sure, a fact which, however, does not make us weep.
Fortunately, Carranza was no more eager for war than
was Wilson; both sides were looking for a way to avoid
general hostilities and still save face.

On July 4,

Candido Aguilar, the Mexican foreign minister, informed
Lansing that the Carrizal prisoners would be released, and
tensions eased considerably. 139

With the Mexicans "very

anxious for a conference,"140 the two nations eventually
resolved their differences over a table in New .London, Connecticut rather than in battle.
The last American troops left Mexico on February 5,
1917.

It is no coincidence that after Carranza came to an

agreement with the United States, the border raids con-

1J9
nected with the Plan of San Diego also came to an end. 141
As for the elusive Pancho Villa, his fortunes revived temporarily with the nationalistic fervor that the Columbus
raid produced, but he was never again a major factor in
Mexican politics.
Perhaps the most important outcome of the MexicanAmerican crisis of 1916 was that it persuaded Carranza to
seek closer ties with another country which could be of
help in the event of a future clash with the United
States. 142 Apparently earlier overtures to Japan had not
met a sufficiently positive response! 4 J so Carranza turned
to his only real alternative: Germany.
Carranza, as we have seen, was aware of Germany's involvement in the Huerta conspiracy of 1915, and he was undoubtedly astute enough to understand the roots of Germany's
motives for providing help to his government; yet his position was such that in all likelihood he decided to accept
German assistance,
worth.

i~

it could be had, for what it was

From his subsequent actions it is clear that Car-

ranza had no intention of becoming merely a tool of German
foreign policy.
Carranza's shift toward Germany began slowly, the
first move coming in response to Germany's recognition of
his government in November 1915 (three weeks after the
United States).

Carranza, to the relief of the German min-

ister, subsequently ordered Mexican newspapers to stop

140

printing anti-German propaganda.

144 In January 1916 he

took a more significant step and appointed Arnoldo KrummHeller to be the Mexican attachEf in

~erlin.145 Krumm-

Heller was a major in the Constitutionalist_ army, but he
was also an active member of the Union of Subjects of the
German Empire; his inflammatory speeches in border towns
during 1915 have led to speculation that he was involved
in the Plan of San Diego. 146
It was during the Mexican-American crisis in June and
July of 1916, however, that Mexico began to seek help from
Germany for protection against the United States.

At this

time Carranza consciously sought to exploit German-American
tensions, even if his initial attempt was almost amusingly
naive:

Aguilar, the Mexican foreign minister, asked Eck-

hardt "if he could keep the United States permanently under
the pressure of war with Germany." 14 7
In October, however, Carranza's government began a
series of more ambitious initiatives.

The Mexican envoy

in Berlin proposed an agreement under which Germany would
declare to Wilson its objection to American intervention in
Mexico.

In return, the Mexicans offered "extensive support

for the German U-boats, should they desire to attack English oil tankers leaving the port of Tampico.• 148 In November five additional proposals were made.

Germany was

asked to provide military instructors for the Mexican army;
to build arms and ammunition factories in Mexico; to allow
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Mexico to acquire German submarines; and to help build an
•efficienttt radio station to establish direct communica-

tions between Germany and Mexico.

In addition, Carranza

wanted to conclude a new treaty of friendship with Germany
covering commercial and maritime relations, since, the Mexicans claimed, the old treaty had been rendered out of date
by new developments. 14 9
Carranza's proposals were obviously intended to reduce Mexico's dependence on the United States for its military needs.

The Mexicans had become painfully aware of

this problem during the recent crisis when Wilson clamped
an arms embargo on Mexico; German help in correcting this
deficiency would have strengthened G.ermany' s hand against
the United States considerably.
Germany was not yet ready to openly support Mexico,
however, even if it had been able to mee.t Carranza' s requests.

Several months later, Arthur Zimmerman, the German

secretary of state, defended his rejection of the Mexican
overtures, saying "I did not think the moment for such a
move had arrived.

I did not yet know

whether there would

be unlimited U-boat warfare and whether, as a result, our
relations with America would be severely strained.
expressed myself with unusual caution."l50

Thus I

On the other

hand, Germany did not wish to alienate Carranza, and contemplated selling Mexico 20,000,000 rounds of ammunition
through a German company in Chile. 15 1
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Lansing received information (apparently from the
British ambassador in Washington) that Carranza was flirt-

ing with the Germans, and at the end of October he instructed the American representative in Mexico

C~ty

to warn Car-

ranza that .. the Allies will find themselves obliged to take
energetic measures in case it comes to their knowledge that
aid has been granted to their enemies in Mexican waters."
He continued: 152
Make clear to General Carranza the importance of
immediately taking effective measures designed to
prevent the use of Mexican territory as a basis of
operations for belligerent ships, ••. General Carranza must ever bear in mind that the slightest breach
of Mexican neutrality may lead to the most unfortunate of consequences.
To this Aguilar cryptically replied that if any German submarines were found operating off the Mexican coast his government's actions would be formulated according to circumstances.153
Carranza's attitude toward Germany at this time and
in the following months is

difficu~t

to determine.

Plainly

he wanted to shore up his position against the United
States, but it is unlikely that he wanted to conclude an
actual alliance with Germany.

Probably he was attempting

to increase his options in case of a war with the United
States. 154 Moreover, public support from Germany, if it
could be obtained, would give the Mexican government an extra measure of political leverage on other questions over
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which disagreement with the United States already existed
or could be expected. 155

In any case, the Mexican over-

tures probably encouraged the German Foreign Office to believe that an offer of an alliance would be_favorably received by Carranza.
On January 9, 1917, the German government made the
fateful decision to resume unrestricted submarine warfare.
It was well understood by German leaders that this move
would lead to a break in relations with the United States
and perhaps to an American declaration of war, but, as
Bethmann-Hollweg reluctantly put it, the U-boat gamble was
Germany's "last card," one with a "very favorable" chance
of success; and ~If success leads, we must follow." 1 56
Field Marshall von Hindenberg assessed the situation in this
way:l57
We are counting on the probability of war with the
United States and we have made all preparations to
meet it. Things cannot be worse than they are now.
The war must be brought to an end by whatever
means as soon as possible.
The German decision was partly based on the belief
that any military contribution to the war effort by the
United States would be negligible; this impression had been
reinforced by the U.S. Army's thoroughly unimpressive showing during the Mexican-American crisis the summer before. 1 5 8
Tirpitz's successor, Admiral von Capelle, thought the
chance of the United States sending troops to Europe "zero,
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zero, zero." 159

Even so, it was decided to offer an alli-

ance to Mexico to further hinder the potential enemy.
On January 16, 1917, Secretary of State Zimmermann
cabled his famous message to Bernstorff : 160
Telegram No. 158.
Strictly Confidential.
For your Excellency's exclusively personal information and transmission to the Imperial Minister
at Mexico by safe hands:
Telegram No. 1.
Absolutely Confidential.
To be personally deciphered.
It is our purpose on the 1st of February to
commence the unrestricted U-boat war. The attempt
will be made to keep America neutral in spite of
it all.
In case we should not be successful in this,
we propose Mexico an alliance upon the following
terms: Joint conduct of war. Joint conclusion
of peace. Ample financial support and an agreement on our part that Mexico shall gain back by
conquest the territory lost by her at a prior
period in Texas, New Mexico and Arizona.
Arrangement as to details is entrusted to your
Excellency.
Your Excellency will make the above known to
the President in strict confidence at the moment
that war breaks out with the United States, and
you will add the suggestion that Japan be requested to take part at once and that he simultaneously
mediate between ourselves and japan.
Please inform the President that the unrestricted use of our U-boats now offers the prospect
of forcing England to sue for peace in the course
of a few months.
Confirm receipt.
ZIMMERMAN
This message was intercepted by British agents, and
its contents were made known to Woodrow Wilson on February
24.

Meanwhile, on February 5 Zimmerman had sent a second

telegram to Mexico, instructing Eckhardt to begin the

145
negotiations immediately and to offer a post-war alliance
if Japan could be persuaded to join. 161 The existence of

this note was apparently unknown to Wilson, but in any
case it was hardly as sensational as the first.
The story behind the interception of the Zimmermann
telegram, and the effect that public disclosure of the German proposals had on American opinion, is well known. 162
There is little question that the alliance offer, which became public on March 1, a month after Germany openly resumed unrestricted submarine warfare, did much to persuade
Wilson and the American public that Germany posed a real
threat to the most basic interests of the United States
and that a declaration of was was therefore justified.

As

Wilson stated in his war message to Congress on April 2,
Germany's efforts at espionage and sabotage in the United
States and Mexico served to "convince us at last that [the
German] Government entertains no real friendship for us
and means to act against our peace and security at its
convenience.

That it means to stir up enemies against us

at our very doors the intercepted note to the German Minister at Mexico City is eloquent evidence." 16 3
The Gennan proposals received no affirmative response
in either Japan or Mexico.

The Japanese foreign minister

publicly denounced Zimmermann's alliance idea, calling it
"absurd" and

n

preposterous," and said that the note
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demonstrated that German leaders were laboring under a
•mental delusion." 164 The attitude of the Mexican govern-

ment, however, was ambiguous.

When asked by the American

ambassador on March 10 to explicitly

rejec~

the proposals,

Carranza claimed that he had no knowledge of them and reiterated his desire, first expressed on February 1, to organize an agreement among the neutral powers to impose a
peace on Europe. 165 In his report to Washington, Ambassador Fletcher expressed his belief that "under present circumstances" Carranza would not accept the alliance bid,
and speculated that Carranza's refusal to categorically reject the German proposals was part of an attempt to induce
the United States to accept a peace conference of neutrals.166
Carranza's statement to Fletcher was of course ingenuous.

At least as early as February 20, Eckhardt had dis-

cussed the proposals with Foreign Minister Aguilar, who
seemed "not in the least reticent;" 16 7 and not long afterward Carranza himself discussed the offer with the German
minister. 168 No Mexican records directly concerning the
government's response to the German proposition have been
found but other evidence indicates that Carranza did not
believe that the time was ripe for an actual alliance as
proposed by Germany.

He did, however, wish to keep the

possibility open in case Mexico was invaded by the United
16
States. 9 On April 14, two weeks after the United States
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declared war on Germany, the German minister reported that
Carranza had decided to remain neutral: .::''He says the alli-

ance has been wrecked by premature publication but might
become necessary at a later stage," Eckhardt wrote, adding
that Carranza had expressed his desire to "discuss the
matter again~ if Mexico should find itself at war. 1 7° Thus,
Carranza's announcement the next day that he was determined
to maintain ''the most rigorous and strict neutrali ty"l7l
should not be accepted at face value.

So long as Carranza

intended to steer an independent course, so long as a major
confrontation with the United States was a possibility,
prudence dictated that Mexico could not reject altogether
the possibility of help from a powerful, albeit beleaguered,
third power.

In this context it should be remembered that

in early 1917 the outcome of the Great War was by no means
certain.

The ability of the United States to raise, equip,

and transport an ·effective army was unproven, and disturbing reports were beginning to filter out of Russia.
Although the Germans had hoped to tie down the United
States in Mexico, it is a fundamental irony that MexicanAmerican tension, and particularly the crisis of 1916, helped indirectly to draw the United States into the First
World War.

The unimpressive military showing of the United

States confirmed the mistaken belief of German analysts
that the United States would not be able to make a significant military contribution to the Allied cause in time to
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exercise a decisive influence on the outcome of the war.
This miscalculation contributed to the German decision to

employ ruthless submarine warfare regardless of its impact
on German-American relations.

Thus, as Clarence Clendenen

has observed, "an indirect but very real line of descent"
connects the Columbus raid, and the subsequent crisis, to
America's entry into the war. 1 72 More importantly, the
events of 1916 persuaded Carranza to turn to the Germans
for help against the United States, a move which in turn
encouraged Germany to propose a formal alliance with Mexico.

Thanks to the diligence of British intelligence oper-

atives and perhaps a bit of bad luck, this extraordinary
diplomatic initiative backfired miserably.

Germany's activi-

ties in Mexico, together with its covert operations in the
United States and the submarine question, convinced Woodrow
Wilson and a majority of the American people that Germany
was indeed an enemy of the United States.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
"Poor Mexico," Porfirio Diaz once said, "so far from
God and so near the United States."

Germany's policies in

Mexico ultimately had little to do with the Empire's economic interests there.

Those were small, but even had

they been more substantial, they would have been subservient to Germany's larger interests.

For German policy

makers, Mexico's primary value lay in its strategic location.

The Zimmermann note was only the culmination of a

decade of German hopes to use Mexico as a pawn in the international competition for world power.
By 1905, as we have seen, Germany's ambitions for
political expansion in the western hemisphere had been
checked by a healthy understanding of political realities.
So long as Germany's European estrangement threatened the
Empire's most basic continental interests, Germany had
little to gain and much to lose from an overt confrontation
with the United States, a nation which had elevated the
Monroe Doctrine almost to the level of inviolable law
during the first years of the twentieth century.

The

British, under strategic pressures similar to Germany's,
had responded by conceding hegemony in the Caribbean to

161

the United States.

Not so Germany.

German leaders main-

tained their hopes for expanded influence in the western
hemisphere, but perforce were compelled to promote Germany's interests there through covert and indirect methods.
German policy with respect to Latin America was therefore
torn between the need to satisfy two fundamentally incompatible principles: the ambitious drive for enhancement of
national power and prestige, and the oddly concomitant
fear of over-extension and destruction.

In an attempt to

reconcile these conflicting interests, Germany employed
the strategy of setting its potential enemies against each
other, in the pursuit of "Weltpolitik with the wars of
others."
Mexico was destined by its geographical location to
play an important part in the geopolitical calculations of
the German leadership.

There were early thoughts of

strengthening Mexico to counterbalance the United States,
and later Mexico was the centerpiece of the Kaiser's attempts to incite a war between the United States and Japan.
It is clear, however, that Germany's temptation to seriously play the Mexican card increased as Germany's
situation became more dangerous.

Eur~pean

When it became obvious

shortly after the outbreak of the world war that Germany
would not enjoy a quick victory, the opportunities presented by the Mexican revolution for the distraction of the
United States began to outweigh the risks involved.
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Germany's covert activities in Mexico and the United
States during the world war amounted to an attempt to

attack or choke off Allied supply lines by almost any means
available.

The realization only slowly dawned that the

United States, in providing munitions, food, and other
supplies to Britain and France, was in fact an indispensable part of the Allied war machine, and that America, in
steadfastly defending its right to support the Allied war
effort in this way, was pursuing a course of action directly inimical to Germany's very survival.

Even so, for

po~

litical and very practical reasons, Germany had no wish to
be at war with the United States; its American policy,
therefore, remained outwardly correct, but the opportunistic streak that always lay beneath Germany's formal posture
grew increasingly strong.

In fact it can be argued that

Germany's covert operations in the United States amounted
to a form of undeclared war, albeit with limited resources
and always constrained by the fear of discovery and retribution.
German operations in Mexico were an extension of
those in the United States, but were inspired by years of
attention to Mexico's unique strategic location and the obvious opportunities provided by revolutionary chaos.

At

first, Germany's attempts to draw the United States into a
war with Mexico were guided by the familiar strategy of
distracting Germany's enemies by creating friction with
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third parties.

When these efforts failed, and German

leaders became sufficiently desperate, however, the

Bl!l-

biguities and conflicts that had plagued Gennany's United
States policy disappeared and were replaced by a new strategy, war by proxy: "Make war together.
er."

Make peace togeth-

Zimmermann's second telegram to Carranza, often

ignored, makes it clear that in making the decision for
unlimited U-boat warfare, the Gennan leadership deliberately burned its bridges behind, accepted the inevitability
of war with the United States, and invited Carranza to do
Germany's fighting against the United States, even before
America declared war against Germany.
From Lansing's diary and Tumulty's testimony, we
know that the President and his Secretary of State understood Germany's purposes in Mexico as early as October
1915, and certainly by the summer of 1916, when Wilson said
that war with Germany seemed "inevitable."

This under-

standing surely did nothing to enhance Gennan-American
relations, but neither did it push-Wilson into an openly
pro-war stance.

Veiled hostility was not enough.

It took

the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, and Germany's admitted desire to support Mexico against the United
States in its own interests, to push Wilson into war.
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